MARINE CORPS GAZETTE



This Month's Cover

THE GRINNING PILOT on the cover is 1stLt Howard W. Schewe who works for Bell Telephone in the Chicago area when he isn't flying with the reserves. He is 26, has six years Marine service, and during the war flew with VMO-251 and VMF-222 overseas. The photo is by MSgt Stanley H. Sharpe. That the Marine Air Reserves are a hot flying outfit was proved by the Cherry Point and El Toro war games. For more on the subject see *The Reserves Fly High* beginning on page 8.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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Among Those Present . . .

DEAR SIR:

It is a fact that for every prominent terrain feature captured by Marines in World War II there existed, and still exists, a healthy rivalry between all participants for the honor of being responsible for the capture. As time goes on some of these discussions seem to attain a ferocity hardly surpassed by the actual battle.

It is not in this vein that this letter is written, but rather to correct an error and to insure that full recognition is afforded to all who participated in one of the intense struggles for a critical terrain feature. To the layman such controversy may seem to be quibling over trifles, but to those who participated it seems that the least one can do for those who made the supreme sacrifice is to perpetuate an *accurate* historical account of their various actions.

Fletcher Pratt is quoted from the June issue of the GAZETTE as follows: "When the 29th attacked again on 18 May, tanks leading around both sides of Sugar Loaf, they broke through, the long contested hill was taken. It had cost the 6th Division, 2,622 killed and wounded; the number of shells fired by the divisional artillery was 92,560."

Included among the casualties listed are those of the 4th Marines who were not committed in this phase until they relieved the 29th Marines by 1430 on *19 May*. With full appreciation for the grand job accomplished by both the 22d Marines and the 29th Marines, Sugar Loaf cannot be declared secure until 21 May. It was then that the reverse slopes were in our hands and *the hill* was held, not just the forward slope. When the 4th Marines relieved the 29th Marines on 19 May they were not handed Sugar Loaf. Nor were they handed the Crescent; King Ridge was not occupied either. The 29th Marines had fought valiantly and done what had not been accomplished up to that time, stayed on Sugar Loaf, but they were clinging to the forward slope. Not even the crest could be called ours because it was untenable. The S-3 of the 3d Battalion, Maj Carl Conron, lost his life illustrating this fact. Being a company commander at the time and being assigned the defense of the right sector of Sugar Loaf for the night of 19-20 May, I speak with some assurance. Again our lines, on the night of 20-21 May, were in the same position—on the forward slope of the hill. It was on this night that the large enemy counterattack developed in which approximately 500 enemy were killed. Finally during the day of 21 May the majority of caves and positions on the reverse slope of the Sugar Loaf and the Horseshoe were closed and the hill could be called secured.

Going into Sugar Loaf on 19 May with a company of approximately 160 men, fighting to button up caves and emplacements on the reverse slopes, being hit with a portion of a 500 man enemy counterattack, and on 21 May having a company of approximately 40 men—against a hill that is already secured—is quite a revealing experience. Particularly when one reads about it in the GAZETTE.

From the July issue of the GAZETTE I quote: "As early as 13 May, when the fall of Sugar Loaf and Conical left his flanks substantially in air. . ." The discrepancy between the two issues is difficult to explain when it is realized that on 13 May the hill was only beginning to be recognized for its importance and the difficulty that was to be involved in its capture.

It is sincerely hoped that the Historical Division of the Marine Corps rectifies such situations that mean so much to those who took part.

M. J. SEXTON
Captain, USMC.

Each month the GAZETTE *will pay five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Signatures will be withheld if requested.*

See Here, Mr Reavis . . .

DEAR SIR:

I have read with a great deal of interest Lieutenant Reavis' two recent contributions to the GAZETTE . . . and I would like to throw in my poor penny's worth concerning, *Why Not a Marine Corps Drill Manual?*

My main difference with the Lieutenant is not over his basic premise of the advisability of a Marine Corps Drill Manual, but rather over his assumption of the present condition of close order drill in the Corps. I must qualify my comments with the statement that I have had no duty with troops to speak of for the last two years. However, I doubt very much if conditions in the Marine Corps have degenerated in that time to the extent pictured by Mr Reavis.

The author bases his premise on several assumptions: First of all, that S-3s, and drillmasters do not realize the importance of close order drill in the training schedule. Let me

continued on page 4


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Message Center

continued from page 2

remind the Lieutenant that the Marine Corps spends more time and instruction on close order drill than any other military organization in the United States. In a rather confusing simile, he states that close order drill is like a cameo with regard to discipline, leadership, and knowledge of command. To a certain extent, this is true. Close order drill is an excellent means of instilling discipline, and teaching leadership and command presence in the early stages. But when recruits become marines and officers and non-commissioned officers experienced, it tends to become a meaningless ritual, and to emphasize close order drill unduly, would serve no useful purpose and would destroy the status it enjoys in the Corps today.

High School cadets, using wooden rifles and a fifteen inch step, and performing intricate Hollywood drills are not learning discipline, any more than a row of chorus girls. They are interested only in putting on a good show. As officer in charge of a Recruiting Station, I have had the opportunity to inspect ROTC units and it was evident that their manner of performing close order drill had done little to give them the discipline and military bearing of Marines.

To my way of thinking, close order drill is the vehicle of learning leadership and discipline in the very initial phase, and after that, should be used only for review and physical conditioning purposes. It should not be emphasized at the risk of cutting out field and command problems where leadership and discipline are taught as they will be actually applied in combat. Marines must be trained to be marines, not automatons.

As for abolishing the cadence that the Marine Corps is famous for—never! Drill masters develop a rhythm and smartness in their cadence by practice and observation, not by following the book. Nothing is more lifeless than to hear a drill instructor in front of a platoon, saying "1, 2, 3, 4."

Because of the peculiar situations in which the Corps finds itself so many times, fighting ashore with Army units, and at sea with the Navy, it is only fitting and proper that the Marine Corps use both a Navy publication, the Landing Force Manual, and an Army Manual, FM 22-5.

In conclusion, if Mr Reavis will give a Marine platoon two weeks in which to prepare themselves, I can guarantee him that they'll come out on top in competition with *any* high school ROTC unit in the country.

ROBERT D. BOHN,
1stLt, USMC.

ED.: No recent GAZETTE article has excited as much comment as Lt Reavis' two pieces. We only wish we could print all of the letters and rebuttals. Two brief articles in answer to his drill manual proposal appear in this issue.

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

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Message Center

continued from page 4

Combat V for POWs . . .

DEAR SIR:

Ever since reading *Competitive Promotions,* in the June issue, I have intended to disagree with item 5, Decorations and Awards, as shown in the chart.

As is so often the case, by delaying, I have allowed somebody to beat me to the punch. I refer to the article *Battle Decorations,* by my friend and recent instructor, LtCol Robert E. Cushman. This article, prepared with a thoroughness which is characteristic of Bob Cushman, constitutes, to my mind, a perfect answer to the proposition that battle decorations should be assigned arbitrary weights in a competitive system of promotion.

It should be obvious to anyone that many men who were not lucky enough to get a decoration, would be automatically penalized by such a system. Likewise, the man who received the Navy Cross for an act which was equalled by a man who got only a Bronze Star, or a commendation ribbon, is presented with an unfair advantage which compounds the original injustice. The purpose of battle decorations is the maintenance of morale, not the establishment of a formula for promotion.

Getting back, now, to Bob Cushman's article, I should like to suggest one addition to his recommendations. It concerns the combat V, authorized only when the meritorious act occurs in combat with the enemy.

A few people have been decorated for their acts while prisoners of war. They had no weapons in hand—but their captors did. There was no noise of battle. There was no pill box which they could charge with grenades and flame-throwers.

Instead, there was the grim spectre of starvation, disease and torture. And the only weapon they had to fight with was GUTS. They had plenty of time to think about it. They knew the odds against them. They made the choice in cold reason.

Not in combat with the enemy? They were in combat with him every day, some as long as 45 months. Only, in that combat, the weapons were all on one side—except the indomitable American spirit.

There were no rest periods in New Zealand, Noumea, or the Hawaiian Islands. The combat continued, day and night, without a single hour of safety. And there is no problem of finding the ones who have acted meritoriously. Their conduct will be public knowledge, to which their beneficiaries will readily testify. Conversely, those who deserve no decoration will be equally well known.

To Bob Cushman's recommendations, therefore, I would add:

8. Authorize the wearing of the combat V by prisoners of war who are decorated for meritorious acts performed while prisoners.

DONALD SPICER,
Colonel, USMC.

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PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE FOR THE UNITED STATES MARINES

SEPTEMBER 1948

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This Month and Next

Miltary students are going to be dissecting Operation Market-Garden for years to come because that Allied attempt to sneak across the Rhine was the most ambitious airborne effort of the war. It was not an unqualified success nor was it a complete failure. Perhaps no one has probed into the affair with the thoroughness and exactness of Col S. L. A. Marshall, the ETO historian. A three installment piece begins next month. It is *The Fight at Best* and concerns certain elements of the 502d Parachute Infantry Regiment. It is superb small unit action reporting and is written with Col Marshall's customary clarity and detail.

Having trouble with training aids—or rather, the lack of them? LtCol Raymond L. Murray has an excellent expedient to suggest in *Cloth Terrain Models.*

Looking for a house? As bad as civilians have it they aren't faced with a transfer every two or three years. SSgt Louis A. Capozzoli puts down his troubles in *Inadequate Naval Housing* .

Palestine continues to occupy its share of world attention. Col Manly L. Curry follows his excellent *Background for Palestine* with *Strategic Palestine* which gives some of the reasons why the troubled strip of Levant coast seems doomed to be history's traditional battleground.

As most military readers know, the Army has injected an added note of realism in its postwar maneuvers by organizing an "Aggressor" Force. This is an "enemy" complete with weapons, uniforms, and distinct organization and tactics. LtCol Cecil W. Shuler thinks we might do well to organize a similar force. He sets forth his recommendations in *Let's Have a Maneuver Enemy.*

Duty with the reserves seems attractive enough. It gives you a chance to get away from a purely military environment. On the surface the assignment seems most pleasant. But LtCol Carl J. Fleps says *Organized Reserve Duty Is No Frolic.*


The Reserves
Fly High

The Marine Air Reserves have twice proved they can mobilize in 24 hours. At the 1948 Cherry Point war games over 2,000 reservists quickly assembled to form a provisional wing of 12 squadrons with 184 Corsairs ready for immediate action

CAPT JERRY FINK IS 26, A GRINNING, HAM-HANDED Irishman, and a law student at Kent. During the war he busted up two Jap ships with his rockets. Now he flies with Marine Reserve Fighter Squadron VMF 121. He is almost the typical reserve pilot and VMF 121 is almost the typical reserve squadron.

LtCol Leonard K. "Duke" Davis skippered VMF 121 during its Guadalcanal days. Now he is commanding officer of the Marine Air Detachment at NAS, Glenview, Illinois, and the present VMF 121 operates under his aegis. Forty-seven reserve pilots fly with 121 and there is a waiting list of others who would like to. With all the Chicago area to draw upon their entrance requirements are stiffish and they can afford to be selective.

Some squadrons, such as VMF 142 at Miami, have their own on-station transition program and convert former transport, dive bomber, and torpedo bomber pilots to the fighters. Transition training begins with the SNJ, then the F6F, and finally the Corsair.

There are 27 fighter squadrons and 8 ground control intercept squadrons in the Marine Air Reserve Training Command. Twenty-four of the VMFs and all of the intercept squadrons were in a sufficient state of readiness to play a role in this year's summer maneuvers. First at Cherry Point on 11 July and then at El Toro on 8 August, MARTCom demonstrated that it could pull together its component squadrons within a double turn of the clock to form provisional fighter wings. Twelve fighter and three intercept squadrons participated in each of the maneuvers. The two-week training programs at Cherry Point and the West Coast air base followed similar schedules. At the East Coast maneuvers, 2,132 reserve officers and men arrived on 11 July *by air*—an administrative air lift which was no mean feat in itself. Fifty-six per cent of the muster roll strength of the organized reserve squadrons concerned attended.

The reserve pilots flew in 184 Corsairs—their reserve status indicated by the broad orange band aft of the cockpit. The remaining officers and men arrived via about 60 Marine and Navy transport aircraft—R4Ds, R5Ds, and R5Cs. The planes droned in from shortly after dawn until late afternoon. The concentration of aircraft was the greatest at the East Coast air base since the war's end. The squadrons were grouped into two

By Capt Edwin Simmons



Concentration of aircraft was greatest since end of the war. 184 fighters and 60 transports were used.

Jacksonville's Sgt Harold B. Chiles, a converted army medic, signals out a VMF 144 fighter plane.

Capabilities of new Marine Corps helicopters were demonstrated to the visiting reserves.

MSgt George W. Britt, engineering NCO of jet fighter squadron VMF 122, points out the business end of the McDonnell Phantom.

Pvt Peter Carlson is 18 and a student Evanston, Illinois. Approximately one-half of the Marine Air Reserve enlisted personnel are veterans; the rest are aviation-interested teen-agers.

provisional MAGs under a provisional wing headquarters. BrigGen Christian F. Schilt shifted his Marine Air Reserve Training Command from NAS, Glenview, to Cherry Point for the maneuvers. The gaps on the wing and MAG headquarters staffs were filled out with volunteer reserve officers.

The first week's training was largely a matter of orientation and a sharpening of techniques: aerial gunnery, rocket firing, strafing, bombing, simulated carrier landings, combat air patrols, and reconnaissance. The MGCISs threw up a defensive radar screen around the field.

The familiar, rugged, war-tested Corsair—still the basic air weapon of Marine Aviation—is standard equipment for the reserve squadrons. Each squadron has a complement of 18. Both the Goodyear FG-1 and the Chance-Vought F4U series are used.

"Still a damned good plane," is the consensus of the reserve pilots. "Good ground and carrier characteristics and well-adapted for close air support." But when it comes to scrapping with the new jets they shake their heads: "It wouldn't be a fight. The jets would make one pass. If they nailed you, you'd be through. If they missed, you'd never catch them."

For the ground personnel there were lectures, demonstrations, and on-the-job training. New model Fleet aircraft—the AM-1, AD1, and F4U-5—were put through their paces for the visitors. LtCol Marion E. Carl's jet-flying VMF 122 staged an impressive show. The capabilities of the HO3S-1 helicopter were demonstrated and the reservists heard about the latest developments in cold weather operations and pilotless aircraft.

For the second week's training all the techniques of close air support were tied together in a bundle and thrown at the reserves in the form of a full-scale air support problem. The supposed situation was that an "aggressor" force, identified as the 61st Light Infantry Division, was garrisoned in the Camp Lejeune area. On the morning of 18 July, the Third Phib Corps landed on



The Problem:

The enemy had occupied the Camp Lejeune area; III Phib Corps landed to drive them out; Reserves flew close support

Onslow Beach, the 1st Marine Division on the right, the 2d Marine Division on the left. Their objective was the air strip at Peter Field Point. By sundown of 19 July the attackers were approaching the south east shore of New River Inlet.

From here on the field exercise got out of the map problem stage. Actually on the ground were the 2d Marines, supported by Battery A, 10th Marines. Objective One was the river line. Once taken, a river crossing was made with the help of the 2d Amphtrac Battalion.

In the air, both close and deep support missions were flown by the air reserves. Some were planned strikes and some were called by the tactical air control party. Targets were designated by the Division's tactical air direction center. Live ammunition was used for the deep support missions. There were two orbit points (pre-strike rendezvous areas); one for armed aircraft, one for unarmed. By the time problem was over, the regulars had been visibly impressed by the easy familiarity with which the reserves slammed their Corsairs around the skies. For the flyers there was a new appreciation of the problems of the ground forces.

The second day's problem was a virtual repeat of the first day. This gave the reserve pilots, who were not flying on one day or the other, a chance to go along with the infantry and observe the maneuvers from the ground. They returned with a healthy respect for the endurance of the foot troops and a vast admiration for the pin-point accuracy of the Marine artillery.

When the flyers returned to Cherry Point on the evening of the second day they learned that the maneuvers had been cut short a day because of approaching bad weather. The reserve squadrons were ordered to get in the air and on their way home as soon as possible in the morning. The night was spent in packing and securing. The first squadrons were in the air shortly after dawn. By noon operations at Cherry Point had subsided almost to normal.



Before the attack, squadron combat intelligence officers were brief by Maj Orville N. Foreman, Chicago lawyer and volunteer reserve officer, who acted as 1st Provisional Reserve Wing G-2.



Capt Albert E. Hacking, wartime ace and now acting CO of Squantum's VMF 235, indicates targets to his squadron before taking them up for a mid-morning strike. Live ammunition was used.



Ordnancemen from Norfolk's VMF 233 replace an overhauled .50 caliber aircraft machine gun. Two of the Corsairs' six wing guns were used in the firing problems in addition to rockets and bombs.

Marines from Squantum's VMF 235 arm their squadron's planes. Air reserve units do their own maintenance.

Three of Anacostia's VMF 321 pilots compare notes after returning from a strike against the "enemy."



Back from a close support mission, pilots of Glenview's VMF 121 are questioned by assistant intelligence officer, 1stLt William W. Kass. Squadron CO Maj Robert Ingram sits to his left.

The 27 fighter squadrons and 8 intercept squadrons are normally based at 22 naval air stations. Each NAS has a Marine air detachment consisting of one regular Marine officer in command, two reserve officers on continuous active duty, and from 36 to 58 enlisted men. The enlisted personnel are "station keepers"; reserves on continuous active duty with the understanding that they will not be transferred from their present station. The purpose of these detachments is to organize and supervise the Organized Reserve squadrons.

Aside from the help of the Marine air detachments, the reserve squadrons are self-sufficient. Most of them put in two full days a month—generally either Saturdays or Sundays. They do their own maintenance, servicing, housekeeping, training, administration and recruiting.

Each squadron has a T/O authorization of 45 pilots, 12 ground officers, 164 enlisted men, 1 doctor, and 4 hospital corpsmen. Nearly all the squadrons have waiting lists of reserve pilots who want to fly with the Organized Reserve. A second lieutenant pilot who attends all his squadron's scheduled drills and the 15-day summer maneuver period draws a total of $567.00. The pay scale moves up, naturally, with rank. A flying reserve colonel could draw a total of $994.99. A squadron commander is eligible for an additional $240.00 per year as administrative pay.

All of the ground officers are former Marine officers although not all of them have had previous aviation experience. Approximately one-half of the enlisted personnel are former marines. There is a scattering of Air Force, Army, and Navy veterans, some with previous aviation experience, some without. The remainder are the postwar crop of teen-agers, without previous military experience, but eager to learn about combat aviation. The enlisted pay scale for full attendance ranges from $157.50 per year for a private to $346.50 for a master sergeant. Longevity for both officers and men applies only during the active duty training period. All of the reserve squadrons are fighter-bomber squadrons and the



CHERRY POINT—10 JULY TO 24 JULY

VMF 121
Glenview, Illinois

VMF 132
New York, New York

VMF 142
Miami, Florida

VFM 144
Jacksonville, Florida

VFM 233
Norfolk, Virginia

VMF 235
Squantum, Mass.

VMF 217
Squantum, Mass.

VMF 244
Columbus, Ohio

VMF 251
Grosse Ile, Michigan

VMF 321
Anacostia, D. C.

VMF 351
Atlanta, Georgia

VMF 451
Willow Grove, Pa.

MGCIS 19
Grosse Ile, Michigan

MGCIS 21
Squantum, Mass.

MGCIS 22
Glenview, Illinois

CHERRY POINT—24 JULY TO 7 AUGUST

MGCIS 15
Atlanta, Georgia

MGCIS 17
Willow Grove, Pa.

EL TORO—7 AUGUST TO 21 AUGUST

VMF 112
Dallas, Texas

VMF 236
Denver, Colorado

VMF 123
Los Alamitos, Calif.

VMF 241
Los Alamitos, Calif.

VMF 124
Memphis, Tennessee

VMF 141
Oakland, California

VMF 143
New Orleans, La.

VMF 213
Minneapolis, Minn.

VMF 234
Minneapolis, Minn.

VMF 215
Olathe, Kansas

VMF 216
Seattle, Washington

VMF 221
St. Louis, Missouri

MGCIS 16
Minneapolis, Minn.

MGCIS 18
Los Alamitos, Calif.

MGCIS 20
Dallas, Texas

Marine Air Reserve commander BrigGen Christian F. Schilt (center) was well pleased with the maneuvers. BrigGen Ivan W. Miller (left) and MajGen Field Harris (right) were impressed.

Corsair is the only plane regularly assigned to them. This is in line with Marine Aviation's emphasis on close air support tactics. It is almost as axiomatic that every Marine aviator be a fighter-bomber pilot as it is that every marine be primarily a rifleman.

The Marine ground control intercept squadrons have a T/O strength of 9 officers, 80 marines, and 3 hospital corpsmen. Most of these are at close to authorized strength except for the medical personnel.

Esprit de corps in the air reserve units is understandably high; no one belongs unless he wants to. If his interest lags and his drill attendance falls off, he is dropped from the rolls and reverts to the inactive volunteer reserve.

Some of the squadrons have piled up flying records which would be the envy of many a regular unit. Nearly 58,000 hours were logged by the member squadrons of the Marine Air Reserve Training Command during the last fiscal year. Their accident rate was only 10.4 per 10,000 hours and there were few serious casualties. This compares favorably with the Fleet average. The Anacostia squadron, VMF 321, for instance, boasts a record of over 10,000 hours since its organization in 1946 without a single operational accident.

At the conclusion of the Cherry Point maneuvers BrigGen Schilt stated that the operation had very definitely proved:

(1) That quick movements of Marine air reserve squadrons into combat positions can be accomplished within 24 hours;

(2) that Marine reserve pilots, ground officers, and enlisted personnel are capable of expert, full-time work under combat conditions;

(3) that, in the pattern set by the Marine Air Reserve Training Command, effective reserve air strength can be developed on a "part-time" or "week-end" basis, and,

(4) that the maneuvers demonstrated that the United States can build that reserve air strength at economical cost. USMC

Convoy Escorts



By RearAdm Miles R. Browning

THE MISSION OF A CONVOY ESCORT IS TO PROTECT the ships in the convoy in order to insure their safe and timely arrival at their destinations. Evasion of detection and attack is a major objective of all convoy operations and it constitutes one of the principle reliances in achieving the ultimate goal of successful passage; however, evasion is practicable only within acceptable time and space limits. Convoys cannot hope to avoid being located and subjected to attack at times and it is then that the escorts' function of screening and protecting their charges is called into active play.

The composition of the escort for any particular convoy depends primarily upon the following five factors:

1. The theater of operations concerned.
2. The character and strength of the enemy opposition.
3. The types and numbers of the forces available for escort duty.
4. The nature of the cargoes carried in the ships of the convoy.
5. The weather and sea conditions which may be expected in the course of the passage.

With respect to the effect upon the escort of the nature of the cargoes carried, it is logical that the more valuable those cargoes are, the greater the strength of escort which must be assigned. Troop convoys, for example, must be given the strongest possible escort, while a greater degree of risk is generally acceptable in the case of cargo vessels. In the matter of sea and weather conditions along the route, small escort ships which are adequate for operations in coastal waters and sheltered sea areas cannot be employed for overseas work where bad weather and heavy seas must be expected at any time. Again, in some areas, sea and climatic conditions may be favorable for operation of shipborne aircraft and dependable air coverage for the convoy can thus be obtained by their inclusion in the escort. In other localities, ship-plane operation may be difficult and inefficient at best and entirely impracticable during considerable portions of the year; under these circumstances, reliance for adequate air coverage must be placed on shore-based air from the nearest friendly bases.

The other three factors which determine escort composition are considerably more complex to evaluate. The first of these is the influence of the theater in which the convoy operations are to be conducted. Its location *vis-a-vis* the home territory and the outlying bases of the

respective belligerents, the strategic situation which exists there at the time, and the nature, extent and specific locale of other military operations being conducted in and adjacent to it, all have definitive impact on the selection of the escorts for the convoys which traverse it.

In the Atlantic, where the greatest convoy activity of World War II was centered, the amount of protection given to overseas movements of men and materials varied widely in different parts of the theater and at different periods in the war, but it always followed a clear and logical pattern. Until the close of the year 1943, the most dangerous convoy passages to be faced were those between Iceland and the northern ports of European Russia. Every form of enemy attack, and heavy air attack in particular, was to be expected along those routes; in consequence, every known form of protection was employed and the most powerful escorts which could be assembled were assigned. The entire area was combed by patrols day and night to locate and report enemy forces. A powerful naval covering force built around at least one battleship and one carrier was usually operated in a position between the convoy routes and the Nazi surface ship bases which dotted the west coast of Norway. Other strong supporting forces of similar composition were held in readiness at or near British bases to provide reinforcement if heavy enemy concentrations were encountered. (The British task group which trapped and sank the *Scharnhorst* in that vicinity earlier in the war was a support element of that character.) Prior to each important passage, German air and naval bases in the Scandinavian peninsula were heavily bombed. The convoy itself was accompanied by an escort of heavy ships and destroyers from the time that it departed from Iceland and this escort was frequently further augmented by units from the bases in the north of Scotland. Finally, from advanced air bases in Northern Russia and Spitzbergen, fighter and torpedo planes covered the last few hundred miles of the route. This thorough policing continued over the area until the end of 1943, at which time the threat had been cut down materially and the Russian Navy took over the task.

THE PROTECTION given to troop convoys in the Atlantic was as carefully organized and as formidable as that described above for the Iceland route, but the merchant cargo convoys from North America to the United Kingdom were not assigned such extensive guarding forces. Convoys from New York and other eastern U. S. ports for Britain were escorted by forces of the United States Eastern Sea Frontier to a point in approximate longitude 60 degrees West, known as "HOMP," (for Halifax Ocean Meeting Point), where the task was taken over by forces operated by the Canadian Coastal Zone. Convoys from Halifax for Britain were also escorted out to HOMP by the same Canadian units which took over the New York convoys there. From HOMP, the Canadian escort continued with the convoy to approximate longitude 47 degrees West and a point called "WESTOMP," (Western Ocean Meeting Point). Here, a mid-ocean escort group, comprising combined forces under the operational control of the British Admiralty relieved the Canadian group and continued on to "EASTOMP," in approximate longitude 22 degrees West. At this point, the mid-ocean group might either be relieved or augmented by forces from British home bases, depending upon circumstances. After 1943, when the enemy threat had dwindled perceptibly, the doctrine was for the mid-ocean escort to take the convoy on into port in the United Kingdom without relief or reinforcement. On westward passages between Britain and North America, the above procedure was used in reverse. By correct timing, escort forces were profitably employed on both the outward and the return legs of all operations in which they participated.

IN THE SUMMER of 1943, there was initiated the practice of including with each of the more important convoys in the Atlantic a special "anti-submarine support group" composed of an escort carrier and her accompanying two to four destroyers. These groups, which were also referred to as "killer" groups, demonstrated from the outset that they were capable of breaking up concentrations of U-boats along the convoy routes. They became a major factor in the final defeat of the Axis submarine campaign and they are now a firmly established feature of modern convoy escort. The experience gained in their employment during the last two years of the war pointed clearly to the fact that the "killer" groups should not be operated as a part of the convoy proper or of the escort, but should retain their identity as distinct and separate task organizations.

Convoy escort in the Pacific presented far fewer and less vexing problems than those encountered in the Atlantic. In the eastern part of the Pacific, the menace of attack upon shipping was slight. Convoys departing from West Coast ports or from Panama, and bound for Hawaii, frequently were escorted only by such combatant vessels as happened to be scheduled to make the trip at the same time. Troop convoys, however, were always given special escort, although the forces so assigned were not of strength approaching that of their Atlantic counterparts. All convoys enroute to the more advanced bases in the South and Southwest Pacific were normally provided with destroyer escort. Also, at both ends of all passages, whether east of Hawaii or in the forward areas to the west, all convoys were covered by terminal escorts from the local Sea Frontier forces. These terminal escorts consisted usually of patrol-type surface craft, aircraft, destroyer types when available, and, in many instances, lighter-than-air units. After the first

Men crowded aboard a troop transport were unaware of the complex problems involved in a convoy. They knew the ships were there, but did not realize the amount of planning that was necessary.

few months of the war, the number of independent ship sailings without any protection other than this brief terminal coverage increased steadily in the Pacific.

The second of the five basic factors bearing on composition of escorts is that of the character and strength of the enemy opposition which must be met. The three main forms in which attack on shipping may occur are:

Submarine attack,
Air attack,
Surface attack.

A convoy may be exposed to any one or any combination of these and in any degree of intensity. The escort must be composed and equipped to deal with them accordingly.

Enemy *submarines* may be encountered anywhere. Their armaments and tactical characteristics are such that night and periods of low visibility are their preferred times for attack. Then, they can approach and retire on the surface, taking advantage of their relatively high surface speed. In daylight and high visibility, their poor sub-surface performance (low speed and extremely short operating radius and endurance) makes them highly vulnerable if located. In general, in striking at convoy shipping, submarines will press home their attacks to a very close range when they are opposed by weak or inactive escorts and are likely to fire their torpedoes at long range when the escort is strong and aggressive.

In the North Atlantic, U-boats in the last war were usually found patrolling stations spaced about twenty miles apart along lines normal to the direction of the convoy routes in the particular sea area. In this disposition, they sometimes conducted sweeps on order from the German Admiralty to locate a particular convoy. Until the beginning of 1944, their attack tactics featured the so-called "wolf-pack" technique which required the concentration of several boats in the vicinity of a convoy which had been detected. The gathering of the pack was made possible by the information contained in the contact and trailing reports which the U-boat making the initial sighting transmitted to its Control Station on the European mainland. These reports included the fact of sighting and the exact position of the submarine in the first message and, in a second message shortly thereafter, the size, formation, and course and speed of the convoy, the number of escort vessels, and other pertinent features gleaned from observation of the group. U-boat trailing or "shadowing" of a convoy could be done at distances up to about 30,000 yards; at the longer ranges out to this figure, however, contact with the quarry was usually maintained by sound listening gear or radar. All radio communication between individual U-boats was banned as a result of our exploitation of their too free use of their transmitters earlier in the war, so that the concentration of a wolf-pack for attack had to be accomplished without direct ship-to-ship exchanges of information.

The escort carrier "killer" groups previously mentioned were largely responsible for the heavy losses which were inflicted on wolf-packs during 1943 and which led to the abandonment of the technique by the Germans before the war's end.

In World War II, air attacks might be experienced at any time when the convoy was within about 1500 nautical miles of enemy air bases. Attacks at these great distances, however, were sporadic and largely accidental. In the main theater of the Atlantic proper, the majority of air attacks were made by single planes, although a considerable number of them included up to four or more heavy bombers, even when delivered at distances of a thousand miles or more from the home bases of the aircraft. In the waters northwest of Norway and in the Mediterranean and Barents Seas, attack groups comprising large numbers of dive and heavy bombers and torpedo planes often made the strikes. Japanese shipping strikes in the South and Southwest Pacific commonly employed large groups, also.

JAPANESE AIR ATTACKS used conventional forms of the bomb and torpedo throughout the war and, during the last year of hostilities, made wide use of suicide tactics. The German Luftwaffe, however, toward the close of 1943, introduced two new and troublesome radio-controlled bombs for shipping attack. These were a controlled glider bomb and a controlled high-angle bomb; the latter was called the "Fritz-X" by our forces. Both of these missiles were usually launched from, and controlled by, Dornier aircraft which had an operating radius of about 600 nautical miles when carrying them. The glider bomb, which was the more frequently encountered of the two, was capable of controlled flights for limited distances after launching from the mother plane. The Fritz-X contained a tail assembly of movable flight vanes and a retarder; by radio control of these, the bomb's trajectory could be varied within rather narrow limits. Defense tactics used by convoys and escorts against these bombs included efforts to destroy them in flight by gunfire, attempts to blind the control bombardier by searchlights and tracer fire, smoke to hide the target, and, towards the end of the war, radio jamming to hamper their control.

The availability of escort vessels and aircraft is the third basic factor which conditions the composition of convoy escorts. Like the others, it cannot be entirely isolated for consideration but must, rather, be weighed in conjunction with them. With this in mind, and in the light of the following brief summary of their respective suitability for the task, the escort is selected from the list of units which are available.

(a) *Heavy escort ships* include battleships, cruisers, and auxiliary cruisers. They are most effective against surface raiders. They are also valuable in defending against air attack, due to their AA battery strength and excellent fire control. They are highly vulnerable to submarine attack and are useless, of themselves, in countering it.

(b) *Destroyer type escorts* include both the high-speed, heavy fleet destroyers carrying offensive torpedo armaments, and the smaller, lighter and slower "escort" destroyers without torpedo batteries. The latter are classed by the British as "frigates." The heavy fleet destroyer is a formidable combatant vessel in any company and is effective against enemy surface raiders of any type when acting in support of friendly heavy escort ships or in low visibility. Both the fleet destroyer and the frigate type are very effective against submarines. When participating as part of a "killer" group—or when coordinated with shore-based aircraft in hunting—destroyers are the most deadly counter weapon the U-boat has to face. All destroyer type escorts are valuable in defense against air attack, due to their efficient AA armaments and their agility to maneuver.

(c) *Aircraft carrier escorts* include both fast (*fleet*) carriers and the slower "escort" or "jeep" carriers. Except in the cases of Atlantic troop convoys during the height of the U-boat menace, fleet carriers were seldom employed for true escort duty in World War II outside of the Mediterranean Sea. In the latter area, they were heavily used to counter the Axis air threat to the vital routes to Malta and the Suez ports. Fleet carriers normally find far greater usefulness as units in covering forces or in other fleet operations which favor full exploitation of their great mobility and striking power without that exposure to attack which is attendant upon presence with a convoy formation. The escort carrier, on the other hand, as her name implies, was designed to provide most of the desirable features of a carrier in escort duties without incurring the disadvantages mentioned. All carriers, whether fleet type or jeeps, possess great potential effectiveness for escort work, provided that sea and weather conditions are such that their air groups can be operated. Then, they can provide continuous and efficient air cover for the convoy and air coordination with destroyers to form "killer" teams. They are also effective against surface raiders (again due to their air groups). However, any carrier is extremely vulnerable to attack in any form, provided that it is permitted to reach her.

(d) *Small escort craft* include such types as patrol craft, trawlers, corvettes, cutters, sub-chasers, etc. They are effective against submarines but possess little value in defense against air attack. Due to their small size and limited sea-worthiness and performance, they are principally useful for inshore and coastal work.

The above brief inventory of relative escort type effectiveness serves as a guide in the selection and organization of the protective screens which are furnished the various convoys in different parts of the world and at

The convoy escort's mission is to protect the ships in the convoys in order to insure their safe and timely arrival at their destinations. Evasion of detection and attack is a major objective.

different seasons of the year. The ships which are assigned to an escort are so disposed, relative to the main body of the convoy, as to best exploit their peculiar strength features and in general conformity with the following doctrine:

(a) *Heavy escorts* are normally stationed in the van center of the formation to permit their quickest possible interposition between the convoy and surface threat from any direction. They are always stationed inside the outer circular screen of destroyers to screen them from submarine attack.

(b) *Destroyer escorts* are disposed in a generally circular screen surrounding the entire convoy and any heavy escorts or carriers present. They provide protection in all sectors, with heaviest concentrations in those which appear the most threatened.

(c) *Carrier escorts* are normally stationed at the rear center of the formation to facilitate their withdrawal for launching and recovering planes without going outside the outer destroyer screen and to take maximum advantage of the protection from bomb or torpedo attack which is afforded by the rest of the escort.

(d) *Other small escort types*, if and when present, are disposed in the same manner as destroyer types.

When enemy attack occurs or threatens, the general doctrine outlined below governs the action of the escort:

First, the vessel or aircraft sighting the enemy must make the prescribed warning signal at once and open fire in the direction of the threat. *If the enemy is a submarine in attack position*, the order of making the warning signal and opening fire is reversed; i.e., attack on the submarine *must* be initiated instantly and the warning signal then broadcast as soon as practicable.

Second, If the attack is by *submarine*, destroyer and aircraft escorts adjacent to the contact join the attack at once. So long as contact with the submarine can be maintained, not less than one and, if practicable, three destroyers must continue the attack until the enemy is destroyed or contact has been lost. If contact be lost, one destroyer must remain on the hunt for at least eight hours thereafter. If the action takes place in water depths of less than 100 fathoms, the U-boat may have bottomed and the hunt is to be continued for at least twenty-four hours after contact is lost. "Killer" group teams, if they are in company, or teams from shore bases if practicable, will take over the hunt from the regular escort as soon as possible.

IF THE ATTACK is by *aircraft*, all escorts close in on the convoy at once to develop maximum intensity of AA gunfire. Carriers launch fighters to counter-attack.

If the attack is by *surface raider*, all heavy escorts and destroyers on the threatened flank concentrate and interpose between the convoy and the enemy. If conditions permit, screen the convoy with smoke. Carrier escorts launch aircraft to join the counter-attack.

Third, escorts must be alert to avoid permitting too much strength being drawn away investigating suspicious circumstance or pursuing a retreating contact; such feints in order to create holidays in the screen were made many times by the Germans. US MC

The Persian Gulf

THE PERSIAN GULF IS ONE OF THE MOST HISTORICALLY interesting, adventurous, and navigationally hazardous stretches of water in the world. Generally acknowledged as the cradle of modern seafaring, its northern waters freshened by the mightly confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates flowing into its northwestern point, its coasts low and reef-strewn on the Arab side and mountainous on the Persian, its longest stretch is less than five hundred miles, its greatest width less than two hundred. North of the tropics, it is still notoriously one of the hottest regions of the maritime world. On its water, the Arab and Persian now carry on most of the trade. Through el Hasa, Kuwait, and Trucial Oman—the states of Arabia on the western side—the camel and the ass compete successfully with the automobile and the truck, though both of these have been known there for quarter of a century. Not a railroad runs in all this hinterland; on the Persian side, there are railroads only in the north, from the ports of the Shatt-al-Arab towards Teheran and what used to be called the Russian pipe-line, and in Iraq, from Basra to Baghdad. Except Basra and the other river ports the chief of which is the great oil-port of Abadan, its ports are roadsteads and its harbours primitive. From Ras Musandam on the point of Oman at the entrance to the Gulf right round to Kuwait, four hundred and fifty miles by sea and twice as far by land, the only indentation worth the name of bay is at Kuwait. A bar at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab blocks the Basra River to deep-draught ships, though dredging keeps a channel open for the oil-tankers. The formation of the Gulf, its shallowness, and its very hot summers have made its waters a great breeding place for the pearl oyster for countless thousand years, and though pearling is somthing of a depressed industry in these days, still more than five hun-

By Capt Alan Villiers

Among the most interesting, adventurous, and navigationally hazardous stretches of water in the world, the Persian Gulf is generally acknowledged as the cradle of modern seafaring. European ships skip these waters where only the Arab sails

dred vessels take part annually in the diving. Through el Hasa, from the desert Nejd into Kuwait, in the peninsular of Qatar, the Beduin roam, still as great nomads as ever in this year of grace 1948. In Trucial Oman are some of the most primitive—and treacherous—Arabs of all Arabia. Yet in the towns merchants thrive, with a great tradition of fair dealings; and there are families in Bahrein, Basra, and Kuwait who are fabulously wealthy.

On the Arab side of the Persian Gulf, much of the territory is ruled by Ibn Saud, but petty sheikhs still quarrel in Trucial Oman and Qatar. The Sheikhs of Bahrein and Kuwait are wealthy now, for each small sheikhdom is worth a fabulous fortune in terms of oil. Prior to the discovery of oil, Bahrein's wealth was in the pearling industry, which the exploitation of the Japanese cultured pearl affected most adversely. Bahrein would have been on the verge of bankruptcy, without oil, in the great depression of the early 30s. Kuwait fared better, for it was a great port and a considerable center for trade—and smuggling—into the highly protected countries of Iraq and Iran. It was only in 1935 that the Sheikh of Kuwait signed an oil concession with the Kuwait Oil Co.—a combination of Anglo-Iranian and the Gulf Corporation—and operations there began in January, 1936. Three years later, a staff of thirty Americans and British was sufficient; today the oil fields of Kuwait look like becoming among the most important of the whole Persian Gulf area.

FROM THE GREAT DELTA of the Shatt-al-Arab and down the whole coast of el-Hasa and towards Trucial Oman, the coastline of Arabia is flat, sandy, featureless, dull. Yet there are good beaches everywhere—beaches of hard firm sand, steep-to in places, ideal for a beaching exercise. Any pearl-diver will tell you where they are; but you must have local knowledge. Off-shore coral reefs abound and even an empty dhow, racing homewards from a long voyage down to Zanzibar and drawing only a few feet of water, must pick her way carefully between the reefs, from Bahrein to Kuwait Bay. I wandered down the coast from Kuwait as far as the island of Abu Ali not much north of el Qatif (near the great oil fields), first in a pearling dhow and then with a pearl merchant, visiting the divers and buying their pearls. We sailed the placid waters of the Gulf by day in a tiny craft not thirty feet long; by night, with all the smaller pearling vessels, we nosed in towards a quiet beach, walked ashore, and put our sleeping carpets on the sand. The nights were soft and good for sleeping; it never rained; the sea was always placid and the conditions, living among the Arabs as an Arab were tolerably good. There were some lovely beaches along the stretch of coastline from Ras as Zor to Abu Ali. But a stranger would have to be mighty careful of his approaches. Charts are inadequate, for the European steamers keep well away from coastal waters here and there is no point in the accurate charting of vast reef areas where only the Arab goes. In Kuwait there are ten thousand mariners, a thousand deepsea and Persian Gulf seacaptains, most of whom know the waters of the Indian Ocean as far as Zanzibar and the Coromandel coast, and all of them know their own Gulf waters. Arabic is a difficult language; but most of the mariners speak at least some Swahili—that lingua franca of the East African coast—or Hindustani. With the increasing influx of oil men, more and more understand American.

a background articl

Kuwait's own waterfront is plentifully supplied with coral and the small breakwaters which the shipowner has

Born at Melbourne, Australia, in 1903, Alan Villiers sailed out of New York with his little full-rigged ship, the *Joseph Conrad*. He went to sea as a cadet in sail at the age of 15, became part-owner of the record-breaking bark *Parma;* master and owner of the full-rigged ship *Joseph Conrad;* was a member of the Norwegian whaling expedition into the Ross Sea; and is a qualified dhow *nakhoda*, perhaps the only European with a certificate of competency from the Sultan of Zanzibar; a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, Trustee of the National Maritime Museum, and Chairman of the Photographic Records Committee of the Society for Nautical Research. He served six and a half years with the Royal Navy during World War II and was awarded the British Distinguished Service Cross.


Persian Gulf
Tracks
Boundaries, international
Boundaries, provincial
Airfields
KHUZISTAN
RAQ
KUWAIT
FARS
KERMA
LARISTAN
EL HASA
QATAR
TRUCIAL OMAN
WESTERN HAJAR
PERSIAN GULF
GULF OF OMAN
Basra
Mohammerah
Zubair
Abadan
Fao
Behbehan
Deh Bid
Shahri Babak
Shiraz
Firuzabad
Jahra
Failaka
Kuwait
Shi'aiba
Ras Aszor
Bushire
Ras Misha'ab
Kahafa
Abu Ali
Lar
Bandar Abbas
Qeshm
Hanjam
Ras Musandam
Shaikh Shuaib
Lingeh
Kais
Qatif
Manama
Bahrein
Hofuf
Riyadh
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built up there to protect his deepsea dhows during the south-west season—the south-west monsoon of the Indian Ocean does not reach the Gulf, but its tempestuous weather makes long voyages by dhow impossible—are made of coral rocks. But the fresh-water dhows from the Basra River come close enough in to discharge their water in skins to carriers who wade and drive their donkeys right alongside; many a grain or rice cargo goes ashore in the same way, not only in Kuwait Bay, to find a way surreptitiously later by camel train into Nejd or by way of the track around Jahra and across the plains towards Iraq. Steamers—even the small British India vessels which maintain communications via Gulf ports with Karachi and Bombay—lie far off-shore, as they must at all Gulf ports, and their cargo is lightered ashore. At Manama in Bahrein Island conditions are the same, though Sitra is a better port than Manama. Very long jetties have had to be built out into the Gulf to permit the tank-ships to berth. Bushire, on the Persian side, is again the same—reefs in a shallow bay, and deep-draught shipping far out; but Lingeh and Qishm are old dhow ports, which once carried on great trade; Hormuz—or Ormuz—was a British naval base, until the Persians turned nasty about it. The British then moved across the Gulf to Bahrein, but it took ten years to make anything of a base in that island. The Persians, between the two big wars, were very touchy about all foreigners and foreign exploitation. The near-renaissance which put the Persian proletariat in pants did the foreigner no good, though the fiercely nationalist Persian was still not above importing "persian" rugs from Italy and Birmingham for resale, and did not mind, apparently, sending his military and naval men to Italy for uniforms and training.

AT THE TIME I was with the pearling fleets—1938-39—the Persians, not for the first time, were laying hot claim to many things including the island of Bahrein, which they were carrying on active propaganda to appropriate. A foreigner's possession of a visa granted by the Bahrein government was sufficient to exclude him from all Persia. There was some considerable infiltration of indigent Persians into Bahrein. The boys were landed on nearby beaches out of small dhows, by night; the dhow sails silently, and every man abroad is past-master of the channels through the reefs, to say nothing of half the illicit trades of the Gulf. There was nothing the authorities could do about it. The Persians were regarded as a vociferous and possibly dangerous nuisance. But all the illicit trade of Bahrein Island was not one-way. Whenever the Persian government stepped up the duties on commodities, it was noticed that the imports of such things into Bahrein increased terrifically, though local consumption went up not at all.

If you searched the world for smuggling experts, you could do no better than enlist your crew from the Persian Gulf; the toughest of the lot, perhaps, come from Trucial Oham. They are good seamen, too, sailing their small and often decrepit craft as far as Zanzibar and the coast of Tanganika. Trucial Oman is a poor place, yielding little wealth. From Abu Dhabi—you can spell it half a dozen other different ways, if you like, as with most Arab place names: no Arab will know what you mean, anyway—along to the more important Sharjah and Dabai, the coast is very low, intersected by many creeks, with swamps full of poor mangrove bushes. Abu Dhabi is the sort of place you wonder why it ever had existence, for Allah alone knows what supports it. Typical of the Trucial coast, the town is built chiefly of date mats; since the coming of long-distance aircraft, Sharjah and Dabai have improved somewhat, for they are sometimes ports of calls for flying-boats. But no one has tried to convert Trucial Oman into a new Florida. No one ever will.

IF YOU EVER do have the misfortune to require major repairs in a vessel on a Gulf commission, you had better go down to Karachi or Bombay. It is a long way—1600 miles from Basra to Bombay—but apart from the naval base at Bahrein, the oil-men's facilities, and a few blacksmiths' shops and the like in Basra, there isn't much doing for steel ships in the average Gulf port. Woodwork is a different matter. The shipwrights of Kuwait are famous

A couple of tough guys. Their guns may be old and dangerous to fire, but they are ready to use them.

Bus for Basra, via Zubair. Not a railroad runs in all this hinterland. The automobile is used a surprising lot even in the most unlikely places. The lack of roads is no deterrent.

for the loveliness of their big dhows, which they build from teak logs (brought up from Malabar) on the beach, using principally an adze. Give him something to which he is accustomed, and the Kuwait shipwright will do you a lovely job. And fast, too—he is a craftsman. But don't dish him out any plans or discourse to him in terms of naval architecture. Like most Arab craftsmen, what he knows is in his own head and his hands; no naval architect makes plans for dhows. They grow, from heaps of wood. Give the shipwright a saw-pit and some Persians to work the burdensome hand-saw; give him an adze, and the beach to work upon; give him a supply of teak logs (which you will find in any shipowner's courtyard along the waterfront) and he will have a ship for you fit to sail to Zanzibar, in a month or two. But let him build her his way, and let the sailors rig her theirs. You can have a lot of fun yachting with the lateen rig, which is not as unhandy as it looks and is a lovely pulling sail. You can have a boat as cheaply as you like, around Kuwait—or you used to be able to. You can have one made of a bundle of reeds, if you like, for they still use them. The fishermen by Ras al Ardh, at the entrance to Kuwait Bay, have dozens of them. If you acquire one, you must be prepared for wet stern. There's no nonsense about trying to make them watertight.

If you're handling a ship of the skies, you'll find good airports at Basra and Bahrein, with good facilities for big boats at both places and also—of a sort—at Sharjah or Dabai. You could put boat down almost any place in the Gulf, but there is often that curse—the flat calm, hazy day, with no horizon anywhere, not a breath of air, not a ruffle on the Gulf to give you even an idea where the thick air ends and the thicker water begins. And for forty days the lousiest of all winds blows petulantly down-Gulf, in June and July. It is the sort of wind that whips up the sand and forces the Bedu to wrap his headcloth around his face, exposing only the slitted corner of one wary eye. With the intense heat of the sun warming up the sand, and not a dam' thing anywhere but more infernal sand, it's the time when you want to stick around the air-conditioned camps of Bahrein Island and the oil places in Kuwait and el-Hasa.

You can land a ship with wheels many places, too—when an airport was wanted at Kuwait a piece of desert at the city gates served quite well—but the thing to know is what do you do after you have landed. Communications are poor, most places. You'll find no post-offices or telephones, away from the few bigger towns. (And they're not so big, either. Kuwait had perhaps 80,000 souls in '39, the island of Bahrein 150,000).

Arms shops are always well patronized. Traffic in guns is carried on openly. The favorite reception for a stranger in this part of the world is a potshot from behind a rock or building.

The local boys, if any, may be friendly if they're not too mad about Palestine. Depend upon it, they'll know the news, isolated or not. The radio blares in every coffee shop in every village and town, and the Arab is an inveterate wanderer. Agents from Palestine come freely, on foot and by camel, collecting and arousing sympathy. The Arab is likely to get his news in highly coloured versions, not often on our side, from independent stations which may be in Iraq or Egypt. This Palestine business, let's hope, is a passing phase best thrashed out by the Semitic peoples themselves in their own fashion: but for the time being it is a serious matter up and down the Gulf, and one you have to bear in mind in dealing with locals, whether or not you're trying to walk away from a crash-landed 'plane.

It's a good idea to carry credentials, in Arabic, from some respected and powerful sheikh. But make sure they *are* credentials. As for signals, depend upon your own radio.

If you ever do get in a jam with a nasty-minded bunch of Bedu, it's a good idea to remember that he loves a show. If you can perform any mildly astonishing physical feats (even a lot of handsprings will help) or some sleight-of-hand—any diversion at all to raise a smile—it'll be a help. The desert Arab is an astounded admirer of physical feats. Since nature calls upon him for a truly remarkable feat in his own very survival, he has no time for fooling with handsprings and the like himself. So he can be diverted with such things. But remember, life is sometimes cheap. A favorite reception for the stranger not only in Oman, not so very long ago, was for the Bedu to drop quietly behind some rock and take a potshot with his gun. He always has a gun. That dagger in his belt is for show or sale. But his gun isn't. It may be old. It may even be dangerous to use. But he can use it, and is still prepared to. The arms shops carry on their business openly. A townsman accustomed to public executions on the gibbet and to seeing thieves' hands sawn off, may not be finicky about some slight hardship caused to you. Where hardship and suffering are part of daily life, the bowels of compassion are sometimes constipated. Make allowances: be prepared. You can do yourself a lot of good, too, by being prepared even with the simplest remedies, especially for dealing with horrible ulcers and skin sores. What you can do for these will be much appreciated, for though they are patiently borne, the Arab is glad to lose them.

A note to the youngsters—don't go woman-ising, fellows. It won't pay. There are plenty of obliging *bints* and *bebes* and the night life even of seemingly quiet towns can be pretty hot. But leave it alone. The wenches who bestow their favors publicly give more than their

charms: you won't see any other kind. Women in well-to-do families still live in complete seclusion. They almost never go out side, and if they do, they are heavily veiled. In these days, they go by automobile. The women spend their days in the courtyard of the *harim*, not necessarily always doing their master's bidding but at any rate kept from the surveillance of other males. The notions of *Esquire* and Hollywood about harem life are far from the truth in all but real rakes' establishments; but best not make your own investigations. The Prophet allows the faithful four wives and plenty of concubines; but few even of the believers take him up on it. If it doesn't pay them it won't pay you either. Even a sheikh keeps his wives apart—a long way apart, for preference. Many of the poorer classes have one wife only, and find that enough. Don't get the idea that women have no rights. They have plenty, and long tongues into the bargain. Most you'll see will be under ten, anyway, or veiled slave-girls—servants and such, not delectable *houris*—wandering in the bazaars buying haberdashery, or matching buttons. The negroid girl servants wander at will, on errands, and are used a lot for intrigues, carrying notes, and picking up gossip. A slave-girl will be well versed in the sex-life of the parish, maybe, but she won't yield much useful information.

As for the wives of the Bedu, they work like hell all day and half the night, and have little time for diversions. As for that, working like hell is a habit in those parts far more than the average fellow back home may realize. Only the well-to-do can loll around. The lot of all others, male and female, is endless toil. The weak die young, and the strong labor.

Bus transport is used a surprising lot even in the most unlikely places, and has been for years. There are buses where there are no roads—lots of them. There is no road between Kuwait and Basra, but there are buses daily on the track that runs around the head of Kuwait's big bay—plenty of room for flying-boats there—and northwards through Zubair. There is no road to Mecca, either, but for the past decade many of the faithful have gone by automobile, and a camel ride that far nowadays is a rare occurrence. I stayed once with a merchant family in Kuwait who thought nothing of a car excursion from Kuwait across all Arabia to Gizan, on the Red Sea nearly a thousand miles away. They didn't bother about roads. The terrain was good, and they knew the tribes of Nejd along the way. They had, too, an abounding faith in the products of Detroit, Flint, and Lansing (Mich.), which enjoyed a good sale among them. I have often gone by car between Kuwait and Basra, and down to Shi'aiba. There are tougher tracks in Wyoming. Usable tracks link Kuwait with the towns of Nejd, in the interior plateau of Arabia; to Riyadh—Ibn Saud's capital—it is about three hundred miles. To Qatif, whence access to Bahrein Island is an easy matter, the track is about two hundred and twenty.

On the Arab side of the Gulf, there are also tracks linking the Hasa town of Hofuf with the coast, Ryadh, and Kuwait (Ryadh itself is over two hundred miles from the nearest water, near Bahrein Island), and another track from Hofuf via Hamrur by the coast, across the head of the peninsula of Qatar and around the coast of Trucial Oman as far as Jimi and over the mountains to Muscat, with connections to the ports of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Dibai. Most of these tracks are good enough for automobiles, but you must take all you require. Especially take water. Fresh water is scarce throughout these regions—in most of them, very scarce. Much of the land is little better than desert. On such fodder as he can find the Bedu runs some camels and sheep: in Oman and Qatar, in the fertile spots, dates are grown: on the banks in the Gulf, there are pearls. These are about all the products, except oil. The small hamlets and villages along the tracks offer little the American wants—cheap bazaars full of more or less junk, the inevitable coffee shops, perhaps an arms shop worth a visit as a curiosity (provided you are not *too* curious), camel harness, desert tents, brassware. This is about the lot.

IN SUMMER—most months are summery around the Gulf—the going on the tracks is hot and dusty, almost insufferably so. But around the north and on the Persian side, the winter months are very pleasant. Sometimes the hinterland of Kuwait is a carpet of wild-flowers. As for the Persian side of the Gulf, villages and townships are much more numerous and so are large towns. Tracks of a sort link them all, with roads to the larger towns. But the roads, for the most part, are poor and apt, here and there, to be precipitious. In the delta of the Tigris-Euphrates, you need a boat to get around. The humidity in these parts can be atrocious. And if you venture out in the Gulf much away from the few steamer lanes, take a *nakhoda* (dhow master) with local knowledge, and keep the lead going.

If you do get out in the Gulf, there are plenty of islands to visit. Many of them are uninhabited and are sanctuaries—more or less—for birds. Failaka, between Fao at the mouth of the Basra Riber and Kuwait Bay, is a most interesting place. It is a low, sandy island, with a good beach, a little local dhow-building, and a bit of fishing. It is a place with a very ancient history. A walk along the beach may turn up fragments of ancient pottery to delight the archaeologist and the Prof, and there are old ruins which have never yet been expertly examined. While I was there some years ago (immediately prior to the recent war) an old stone house was being pulled down in order that its stones could be used to build a new place. One of the stones was

overturned, and an inscription was noticed on it. It took the experts of the British Museum to decipher what the ancient lettering meant and even they could give the thing a date no closer than somewhere between 400 and 100 B.C. It was a message of thanks from a Greek merchant name of Soteles, addressed to his gods, for saving him from shipwreck off the island. The stone came from no local quarry. The experts thought it must have been shipped from Greece, probably coming overland along the ancient camel caravan paths across what used to be called Mesopotamia and now Iraq. The island of Failaka is in a commanding position, in the north; at the Gulf's entrance there are also interesting islands rich in history—Hormuz, which the sailing Portuguese held for years when those great pioneers opened up this part of the world, and India, to European trade; Hanjam, with a good anchorage; Qishm, Kais, Shaikh Shuaib. I once sailed close in by Shaikh Shuaib, coming up in a deep sea dhow from Zanzibar. It looked an interesting place, and the Persian sailors aboard said the fishing there was excellent.



A typical dhow of Kuwait, Persian Gulf. These 60 foot boats are the principal means of trade along this dangerous coast.

THAT DEEPSEA DHOW TRADE, by the way, is a pretty big thing in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait alone has over a hundred deepwatermen registered in the port. Trucial Oman has another hundred, though mostly these are older ships, run down, and sailed on a handful of rice and a little—very little—inferior ghee. Yet whole tribes do not fear to ship off in a sixty-footer down to Zanzibar or to Mombasa. Why not? Allah is merciful; the fare is a few chips (Italian rupees); life at home is tough, and they have nothing to lose. All these dhows engage in trading voyages. They don't haul freights to merchants' account, or engage in shipping practice as we know it. They are wandering peddlers, hawkers of rice and salt and haberdashery, smugglers of hashish and *qat* (and anything else that offers). They set off with dates from Basra or Oman; hawk these around Arabia or to Berbera; thence trade along the coast of the Hadhramaut and ex-Italian Somaliland, taking passengers by the hundred whenever any offer and always on that well-established rule of army transports—the passenger is never right. The Arab asks only room enough on deck to stretch himself; if this is short, he can lie curled. He wants no shelter, and his desert cloak is often his only bedding. He is a tough guy, all right. But he softens up, in the towns.

With the wealth of oil now pouring into more and more of his trading centers, the softening process is perhaps more at work now, than the toughening. Yet I found him a good guy too. I got to know him fairly well, and I wandered among his kind far and wide, never armed. I had no arms. I found the Gulf Arab a straight-dealer, away from Trucial Oman. By and large, he is a citizen most Americans can get on with, pretty well. He has his problems. Health services are few and hospitals fewer. Smallpox takes off many children. Blindness is all too common. Sometimes he is caught up in quarrels between Sheikhs; but Ibn Saud has brought stable government to much of the great peninsula and the Sheikhdoms of Kuwait and Bahrein are well established, though there have been quarrels in them both and may be more. The walled city of Kuwait, with its 8000 houses of mud and coral and Rufiji mangrove poles, its labyrinthine streets where scarcely a water-laden ass can make its way, its city gates where the incoming Beduin must check their arms, its wealth in oil and pearls and the carrying trade, is still primarily an Arab market-place, though there has been a British agent there most of this century, the Germans once planned to build a railroad there, the Turks had nominal control for years, and the Russians sought it as a coaling station.

A great place, the Gulf. If you are scheduled to put in some time there, don't swear about the heat or restrict your activities too greatly to the search for Shiraz carpets and Gulf pearls, for you very probably won't see much of either. But keep your eyes and your mind open, son, and you will learn a lot. USMC

The Seven Years War

By Capt Philip N. Pierce
and Capt Lewis Meyers

"*Sergeant Triguet is left to assist in attending to the duties at Headquarters. He is a respectable old man, and has not other failing than that which but too often attends an old soldier.*"

It is a little difficult to believe that a sergeant was once detailed to assist in the administration of Marine Corps Headquarters—to become, in effect, Assistant Commandant. But, when one also considers that at the same time the responsibility of the entire Marine Corps was entrusted to a lieutenant colonel, while the Commandant packed off to chase Indians, it is obvious that things were often accomplished in strange and wonderful ways in the "old Corps."

He is a respectable old man . . .

Unusual though it may be, it is a matter of record that such a condition once came to pass. In a letter, under the dateline of June 1, 1836, the Colonel Commandant, Archibald Henderson, resigned himself to the fate of becoming an Army officer, designated LtCol Robert D. Wainwright to command the Marine Corps in his absence and detailed Sgt Triguet to assist him.

It is only fair to point out that Sgt Triguet's love for the grape is merely incidental to the tale. It would, however, be a pity to ignore callously such an amusing commentary on one of those minor actors who all too infrequently appear to enliven the often otherwise dull drama which occupies the stage of history.

Our story begins about the time the Marine Corps was celebrating its 14th birthday. The United States totaled only 13 in number, the crown of Spain perched atop the slothful head of Charles IV, and a nation which was to one day give the world the hot dog suffered much from the internal pangs of growing pains. The year was 1790.

It was in this eventful year that the Creek Indians of Georgia signed a treaty with the United States government which was ultimately to affect the Marine Corps. The treaty was, in effect, a promise by the Creek Indians to restore the runaway slaves of the Georgia planters who had taken refuge among them. But, like so many other signees of treaties, the Creeks found it impossible to comply with their end of the agreement.

Some 40 years prior to the signing of the treaty there had occurred within the Creek tribe a schism which brought into being a new tribe known as the Seminoles. The Seminoles, whose name means "runaways" or "wanderers" in the Indian dialect, migrated southward eventually making their home in the territory which is now the state of Florida.

There were two basic causes for this migration by the Seminoles. One was the desire to escape from the

Some of the Marines carried the new-fangled Colt Rifle . . . Col Henderson had a gold-headed cane—

southern planters who continually made attempts to enslave the Indians. The other was to help prevent the capture of the runaway Negro slaves who had escaped from their owners and found refuge among the members of the tribe. Over the years the Indians and the refugee Negroes had become friendly and often intermarried. It was this segment of the Creeks which had broken away to form the beginnings of the Seminole tribe and a new chapter of history, often referred to by the more emotional historians as "a very Iliad of tragedy."

THROUGH THEIR TREATY with the Creeks the government hoped to put enough pressure on the Seminoles to induce the return of the runaway slaves. But by now the ties of blood were so strong the Seminoles refused to acknowledge the treaty, saying they were divorced from the Creeks, and that if any treaties were to be made they must be made with the Seminoles themselves. They also gave government representatives to understand that since they lived in Florida they were subjects of the crown of Spain, and were not duty bound to listen to the demands of such foreign governments as the United States.

Obviously the only remaining alternative was to petition the Spanish government for the return of the slaves who had escaped into their jurisdiction. Under the growing demands of the southern colonies repeated petitions were made to the crown. Charles of Spain, who was having troubles of his own with his wife's lover and a son who was plotting with Napoleon, ignored the petitions.

Undaunted by the refusal of Charles to take the necessary steps to return their slaves, the Georgia planters began to petition their own government for the annexation of Florida. But the wheels of government grind exceedingly slow. The Georgians impatient with the delay organized raiding parties and entered Florida to redress their grievances. The United States being engagd in unpleasant relations with Great Britain at the time had little opportunity to take cognizance of Indian troubles in a Spanish colony. As a consequence the intruders met with defeat and for some years the Seminoles and their white neighbors lived in comparative harmony.

In 1819 Florida was purchased from Spain in exchange for five million dollars. Immediately the slaveholders renewed their demands of the government that their slaves be returned to them. Inasmuch as 75 years had passed since their ancestors had taken refuge in Florida, it was a little difficult for the Seminoles to understand the claims of the southern planters. As a result the claims met with a particularly unenthusiastic response by the Seminoles.

However, political pressure was political pressure even in the early 1800s. Under this pressure the government, who had found their treaty with the Creeks to be a complete fizzle, decided to make a treaty with the Seminoles. Representatives of the government met with the Indian chiefs and reached an agreement whereby the United States would takes the Seminoles under governmental protection and assign them to reservations.

Governmental protection proved to be an empty phrase, however. Certain enterprising gentlemen saw very lucrative possibilities in the profession of slave catching. The "slave-hunters," in direct violation of the terms of the treaty, entered Florida in organized bands to catch runaway slaves which were bringing high prices on the slave markets. There is no evidence that the government made any attempts to stop this practice, although the Indians continually demanded redress.

IN 1828 the idea of immigration was proposed to the Seminole chiefs. The proposal involved the removal of the Seminoles to an area now occupied by the state of Arkansas. Well primed with the sales talks of government representatives extolling the beauty and virtues of this new land, the chiefs agreed to make a reconnaissance of the area. Their report on the new lands would hardly be considered a testimonial by the Arkansas Chamber of Commerce. The tribal leaders found that "snow covers the ground, and frosts chill the bodies of men." Their objections notwithstanding, the Seminoles



The Commandant left a note . . .

were ordered to "Prepare to emigrate West."

When the government prepared to execute the emigration not a redskin was ready. Determined to force the emigration the government sent troops into Florida. Just as determined to remain where they were the Seminoles made preparations for war.

It is a little difficult to determine accurately the underlying causes of the Second Seminole or "Seven Years" War. On the surface the primeval cause appears attributable to the attempts made to recapture runaway slaves. Yet the movement of land-hungry emigrants of the southern colonies into Florida as soon as it became a part of the United States cannot be ignored as a factor.

This encroachment upon the domain of the Indians was a direct violation of their treaty with the government, which guaranteed protection, not only against white settlers, but against hunters and general intruders as well. The Indians retaliated against this new threat to their security by attacking the settlers, and in a short time the horrors of the Second Seminole War were being chronicled throughout the land.

It was in December of 1835 that the war really began in earnest. BrigGen D. L. Clinch who was commanding the U. S. troops in Florida, was charged with the responsibility of the removal of the Indians. Almost a year had been spent in fruitless negotiations, during which outrages, committed by both whites and Indians, had increased ill-feeling to the boiling point. December found the Indians, under the leadership of a colorful half-breed by the name of Osceola, well armed and assembled in the almost inaccessible swamps of the Withlacoochee.

Gen Clinch whose immediate problem was to protect the white settlers, decided to attack the hostile Indians. Since his own force, which occupied Fort King near the present town of Ocala, was too small for the job, he sent to Fort Brooke, located on Tampa Bay, for reinforcements.

The reinforcements numbering 110, under the command of a Maj Dade, answered the call of Gen Clinch with colors flying and bugles blowing. With the possible exception of Gen Custer's embroglio at Little Big Horn, the fate of this force is probably without parallel in the history of Indian warfare.

Shortly after Dade's force crossed the Withlacoochee River they were met with an ambush so effective that only two survivors remained to crawl through the wire grass to safety. One was a Pvt Clark of the 2d Artillery who although badly wounded is reputed to have crawled over to Fort Brooke, a distance of some 60 miles, on his hands and knees. The other was Louis Pacheo, a Negro slave who acted as guide for the force. There is good reason to suspect that the escape of Pacheo, the only member of the band who survived without a scratch, from the ambush was something more than blind luck. Be that as it may, he lived to the venerable old age of 95 and was never taken to task for his treachery, if such it was.

ON THE SAME DAY as the Dade Massacre, Osceola and a small band of Indians invaded a dinner party being given by Gen Wiley Thompson, who had been sent from Washington to oversee removal of the Indians, and murdered the general and his five guests.

If there had been any doubt previously that the war in Florida wasn't in earnest, the Dade Massacre and the murder of Gen Thompson provided the clinching argument.

By the spring of 1836 the army in central Florida found themselves in a difficult situation. Some 1,000 soldiers were trying to round up and deport over 3,000 Indians. Trying to capture Indians in the swamplands and semi-jungles of Florida resolved itself into chasing will-o-the-wisps who had the disturbing habit of suddenly turning on their pursuers in savage attacks. The state militias who had originally augmented MajGen Thomas Jesup's Army of the South soon had their stomachs full of poor food, swamp fever, and general discomforture and by spring left Florida for healthier



. . . crawled 60 miles through wire grass

climes. The nebulous character of the war, and the uncertainty of any measure of final success, occasioned Gen Jesup to write to Washington requesting permission to resign his command and forego the dubious glory of a successful campaign.

To add to the misery of the general situation the Creek Indians, who occupied an area in southern Alabama and Georgia, decided to go on the warpath. The results of this uprising were severe enough to cause the Army to shift its main effort from the Seminole country to the area occupied by the Creeks. It was in the midst of this desperate situation that the U. S. Marines appeared upon the scene in the approved story-book tradition.

THERE IS A TALE, often related by marines, that Col Henderson closed Marine Corps Headquarters during this period. It is said that he locked the door to his office, placed the key under the mat and tacked a neatly lettered signs to his office door which read:

Have gone to Florida to fight Indians.
Will be back when the war is over.
A. Henderson,
Commandant

Unfortunately, as is true of so many charming stories, the basis for this yarn is lost in the mists of antiquity, and its reliability is to be strongly questioned.

More accurate accounts indicate that Col Henderson assembled a Marine regiment composed of two battalions, which represented half the strength of the Corps at that time. LtCol Wainwright assumed command of Headquarters and the Band was left behind to provide the guard. Col Henderson, boasting a force of 38 officers and 424 men reported to Gen Winfield Scott at Columbus, Georgia, for duty. Gen Scott had been ordered to command of the forces in Florida at the beginning of the year. Since Col Henderson was under direct orders of the Secretary of War he technically became an Army officer and in this status was placed in command of a brigade composed of Marines, Army Infantry and Artillery, and friendly Creeks. As a matter of historical record, this marks the first time that Marines were detached for service with the Army under the provisions of the Act of 1834.

Presaging modern dungarees, the troops wore their white fatigues in the field, rather than the green and white uniforms of the period. Armed mostly with muskets, they also had some of the new-fangled Colt rifles which developed a disconcerting tendency to explode spontaneously when carried loaded for any length of time in the heat. Col Henderson antedated the swagger stick era by carrying a gold headed cane. It was a souvenir of HMS *Cyane*, bested in 1815 by USS *Constitution*, with the colonel in command of the Marine detachment.

On 2 June the *National Intelligencer*, referring to "this brave and highly disciplined Corps," commented: "In the present emergency it did not wait even an intimation that its services would be acceptable, but promptly came forth, through its commanding officer, in the first hour of danger, and voluntarily offered to leave its comfortable quarters, and within one week from the offer we see a strong and well-appointed detachment of fine-looking men bidding farewell to families and friends, and taking up the line of march to seek a savage and treacherous foe in a distant land and in an inhospitable climate, to stay the ravages of war, and to protect the innocent, the helpless, and the unoffending."

The Columbus (Ga.) *Sentinel* reported on 1 July: "The first battalion of United States Marines, under command of Colonel Henderson, is now stationed at Camp Henderson, fifteen miles below Columbus, on the western bank of the Chattahoochee. The battalion arrived at this place on the 23d instant, having left Washington on the 1st, and Augusta on the 10th, marching from Augusta to this place in fourteen days, a distance of two hundred and twenty-four miles."

The first activity for the battalion developed when a

Negro boy came into Camp Henderson and reported a Creek war party under Jim Henry, a chief, camped a few miles away. The boy had been a prisoner for several weeks and said the Indians were making for the big swamp. Capt Levi Twiggs took two companies of marines and a company of Georgia volunteers and set off in vain pursuit.

Both the Marine commander and Gen Scott took a more optimistic view of the final outcome of the campaign than had Gen Jesup. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Col Henderson wrote: "It is now expected that the Campaign will be closed in the course of ten days or two weeks. . . ." On the same day Gen Scott went on record to the effect, "war against the hostile Creeks is supposed to be virtually over." One may well speculate as to the thoughts of these gentlemen when they found themselves still engaged in hostilities several months later.

The end of summer brought with it the termination of the Creek Campaign. The Creeks were removed to a reservation in what is now the state of Oklahoma, and the Army of the South again turned its attention to the problem of the Seminoles in Florida.

On 24 June a second battalion of marines under LtCol W. H. Freeman had reached Milledgeville and moved on to Florida. In October the two battalions were consolidated into a six-company regiment and moved to Apalachicola, Fla. to take up the garrison of Fort Brooke. The regimental roster shows the names of officers who were to be active in the Mexican War a decade later: Twiggs, Harris, Dulany, captains; Terrett, Edson, J. G. Reynolds among the first lientenants, and 2dLts D. D. Baker and R. C. Caldwell.

The Marine troops were augmented by a regiment of Creek Indian volunteers some 750 strong who had been mustered and were paid as militia in the service of the United States. The regiment was officered mainly by Marine officers and wore white turbans to distinguish them from the enemy during battle. The Seminoles took a dim view of being pursued by their blood relatives and showed their dislike by scalping all Creeks who fell into their hands. These friendly Creeks fought an advance guard action at Wahoo Swamp on 21 November under the command of 1stLt Andrew H. Ross who afterward died of wounds received.

From Wahoo a four-pronged advance, two columns of Army troops, two of marines, pushed the Seminoles back to the Hatchee-Lustee River; in January Jesup's army moved against this stronghold. On the 23d Capt Harris' company was detached, with a battalion of mounted Alabama volunteers, the Creek volunteers, and Gen Jesup's aide, a Lt Chambers. This force headed for Ahpopka Lake where Osuchee, a chief of some renown, was reported with a large force. The mixed command, under LtCol Caulfield of the Alabama battalion, surprised Osuchee, killed him and three warriors and captured nine more, plus eight Negroes.

Four days later the main body of Indians was located in and near the Great Cypress Swamp and was promptly attacked. Lt Chambers and the mounted Alabamans made a rapid charge and captured the horses and baggage of the enemy, in addition to 25 prisoners, mostly women and children. The braves slipped back into the swamp. Col Henderson left one of his companions to guard the prisoners and horses while the regiment pressed on after the Seminoles, who had taken up a defensive position on the opposite bank of the Hatchee-Lustee River, a deep stream from 20 to 25 yards wide. The troops extended along the river bank and took up a cross fire in an attempt to dislodge the enemy. As soon as the Indians' fire slackened, the troops crossed the river by swimming and means of felled trees. According to Col Henderson's report, ". . . we pursued the enemy as rapidly as the deep swamp and their mode of warfare admitted."

The chase continued until nightfall when Henderson was forced to withdraw his troops from the dense undergrowth. The result of the day's operations was the capture of the Indian women and children already mentioned, 23 Negroes and some clothes and blankets. The loss of the enemy in the several attacks which marked the day could not be ascertained. The battle report

states, however, that one Indian and two Negroes were seen by the troops, dead. Two Marines were killed, four more died of wounds.

As a result of his routing of the Indian forces Col Henderson was brevetted brigadier general, and several marines were promoted for "gallantry." Four days later, Abaham, a Seminole chief, appeared at Henderson's camp under a flag of truce. This marked the beginning of several days of negotiations between Gen Jesup and the Indian leaders at Fort Dade which finally resulted in an agreement by the chiefs to assemble their people and stand by for transportation to their new reservation. The peace treaty was formally signed on March 6. By the end of March great numbers of the Seminoles had assembled at the various concentration camps erected for that purpose. Gen Jesup, believing the war to be over began to discharge his volunteers.

On May 22, 1837 Henderson received orders to proceed to Washington and report to the Adjutant General of the Army. Taking with him all marines except two companies which totaled 189 officers and men, Henderson left Florida the next day.

ON THE NIGHT of June 2, Micanopy, grand chief of the Seminoles, and several of his lesser chiefs who had encamped with their followers near Tampa Bay, the port of embarkation, were abducted and taken to the interior. The next day a report was received from the troops south of Hillsboro that the Seminoles encamped in that vicinity had decamped and taken French leave. These two incidents were the signal for the renewal of hostilities. Jesup reported, "This campaign, so far as relates to Indian emigration, has entirely failed," and earnestly requested once more to be "immediately relieved from the command of this Army." The Seminole War was far from over.

For the next five years Col Henderson vainly tried to get the remaining Marine recalled from Florida. His appeals were met with refusal by the Secretary of War who felt that the need for Marines in Florida was more pressing than the need for their return.

Jesup was finally relieved and realized what had been his burning desire since the beginning of the campaign: to join his family and spend the rest of his life on his farm. He was replaced by Col Zachary Taylor, who was soon elevated to the rank of brigadier general.

The campaign wore on and the possibility of success appeared to grow more remote with each passing day. Osceola died a prisoner at Ft Moultrie in October 1837; he had been arrested while conferring with Gen Jesup. The next year some 4000 Seminoles made the move to Oklahoma, though many slipped away from the New Orleans concentration camps and returned to the Everglades to stay.

The two companies of marines remaining put in four more years of duty along the coast and around the keys of Florida—with the Mosquito Fleet under Lt John T. McLaughlin, USN. From June 1838 to the summer of 1842 this array of half a dozen small vessels, two barges, and 140 canoes was manned by 68 officers and some 600 men, 130 of them marines. For the first two years the CO of the Mosquito Fleet marines was 1stLt George H. Terrett who, seven years later, was to lead the way into Mexico City. 1stLt Thomas T. Sloan commanded the Florida detachment from 1840 to the end of the tour. The object of the squadron was twofold, to intercept communication between the Indians and small boats operating off the Florida coast, and to conduct amphibious sorties into the interior of the Everglades. The Mosquito Fleet operated successfully throughout the remainder of the campaign, and the Indians learned to fear the "sailor boats," as they called them.

IN NOVEMBER 1841 Lt McLaughlin led 150 marines and seamen from his 'fleet' on a 22-day scout through the Everglades. The Seminoles offered no resistance as the expedition explored territory previously considered impenetrable. Lt Sloan and his marines also spent several weeks exploring between the Miami and New Rivers. During the final year the marines garrisoned Indian Key on the east coast and Ft Dallas. A total of 18 men died on this Florida duty, in addition to the regiment's casualties.

In the summer of 1842 the Seminole War gradually petered out, and the Marines returned north in July well pleased to be relieved of what had been six long years of extremely dreary duty. In analyzing the success of the campaign one need only to point out that the Seminoles still occupy the Everglades of Florida.

In the final accounting 61 marines had given their lives in the Seminole Campaign. Over half of them had died from disease and one unfortunate soul had gone to meet his Maker dispatched by a friendly musket ball, "discharged by accident."

Late in 1843 a plain marble monument was erected over the spot where the dead of the Florida War were buried at St. Augustine. It bore the inscription: *"This conflict in which so many gallant men perished in battle and by disease, commenced on the 25th of December 1835 and terminated on the 14th of August, 1842."* The Seven Years War was finally a matter for the record books.

History, which is often guilty of such regrettable oversight, has not seen fit to record the fate of the "respectable old man" Sgt Triguet. It is presumed however that the good sergeant eventually answered roll call in Valhalla, mellow with age and that failing which often attends an old soldier, serenely oblivious to the caprice of destiny which appended him as a footnote to history. USMC

Esprit de Corps

A BASE PLATE McGURK ARTICLE

"How was your leave?" Dusty asked, watching Tex pull a chair up to the table and acknowledge our greetings with his lopsided grin.

"Fine, fine," Tex chuckled, "but wait until I tell you what happened on the train. Damn! This beer is warm!"

"If you don't like it, go buy your own," Boat Space growled, as he signed Tex's name to a chit and moved towards the bar. "One of these days I'm going to resent your habit of filching other people's drinks, Capt O'Reilly."

"Oh, really?" Tex drawled, and as Boat Space started to answer, Johnny grabbed a bottle and glowered at him.

"If you say, 'No, oh Reilly,' Boat Space, I'll deck you," he said. "I've heard that snappy repartee between you two clowns twenty times, and it's wearing thin. What happened on the train, Tex? Was she a blonde or brunette?"

"Neither. It was a civilian. He was sitting next to me, and eventually we started to swap lies. Since I knew that his patter would probably be boring, I immediately identified myself as a marine and started to tell him about the time I almost got the Congressional Medal."

"Poor little tax payer," Boat Space moaned elaborately.

"As I was saying," Tex continued, ignoring the interruption, "I was giving this bird the word when all of a sudden he said, 'What is this here thing you call es-spirit-day-Corpse?' Well, laugh, I thought I'd die! Finally I slowed down enough to explain that it was pronounced *esprit de corps*. That's when he had the laugh on me, although he was too polite to do any more than change the subject."

"What do you mean?" Dusty asked as Tex lighted a cigarette.

"Well, I could pronounce it, but I couldn't explain it." Tex answered sheepishly.

"When you get right down to it," Dusty smiled, "I wonder how many of us can. I know that I can't. How about you Johnny?"

Johnny, being the only member of the "Ale and Quail Club" who came up through the ranks, was usually pretty savvy about things like this. Furthermore, since he was also the only Marine Corps junior in our midst, he was more aware of some of the intangible aspects of the Corps than the rest of us, even though his father, GySgt Edward D. Johnson, had been killed in Nicaragua when Johnny was a pup.

"Well," Johnny said thoughtfully, "I'd say that *esprit de corps* is the common spirit pervading the members of a group. At least that's what Webster's says it is. To be more specific, you might say that it is a feeling that develops, in a greater or lesser degree, whenever men are drawn together in a group that has a common purpose, common ideals, or a common background. One thing for sure, it is a group spirit, so you must have a group to have it, and it must be a feeling common to every member of that group."

"It's awfully close to morale," Dusty commented.

"Yes," said Johnny, "except that morale pertains more to the individual. Even when you say such-and-such a Corps or Army has good morale, you mean that practically every individual in that particular organization has good morale. In other words, good morale in an army is a sum total of a lot of individual good morales. On the other hand, *esprit de corps*, as far as that army is concerned, can accomplish far more since it is *one* spirit and is common to the members of that army as a group. What I'm driving at is that morale is a state of mind; whereas, *esprit de corps* is a spirit that implies enthusiasm, devotion, and a jealous regard for the honor and welfare of the group."

"As I see it," Dusty said, "an outfit with a high *esprit de corps* will invariably have good morale and, in turn, an outfit with good morale will usually have some degree of *esprit de corps*. In other words, the two complement each other. However, just because an outfit has good morale doesn't necessarily mean that an *esprit de corps* will always exist."

"Now you're saying that *esprit de corps* builds morale. Is that right?" Tex asked.

"Exactly," answered Dusty.

"O. K. So we can say that one of the reasons the Marine Corps has good morale is because of its high *esprit de corps*. Now please explain why the Marine Corps has this *esprit de corps*."

"That's a tough one, Tex," Dusty smiled ruefully. "A lot of men smarter than we have been trying for years to answer that."

"I think that we inherited it in part," Johnny said slowly. "By this I mean we didn't have to start from scratch. When we came into the Corps there was already in existence a high *esprit de corps*. It was only natural that we should acquire it from the other members of the group.

"Of course, our brilliant history is another strong reason. To belong to a group with such an honorable and remarkable background fills a man with pride.

"SUCH A FEELING is natural for the type of man who is attracted to the adventuresome and often difficult life of the peacetime as well as the wartime Marine Corps. The unusual and sometimes hazardous demands made by Marine Corps life narrows the type of man down that will volunteer for such an occupation. In other words, this is no racket for a bird who is looking for the soft, easy, purely selfish life. Therefore, I think that the type of man we have always had in the Corps accounts in part for our remarkable *esprit de corps*."

"I believe another reason is that we develop it and protect it," Dusty said thoughtfully.

"How?" Tex asked.

"Yeah, how?" Boat Space boomed. "I don't savvy all of this why we do have *esprit de corps*, and don't particularly give a damn. What I want to know is what can I do to develop more *esprit de corps* in my men and how to protect what they already have."

"Discipline is one way," Dusty answered immediately. "You've never heard of a poorly disciplined outfit having *esprit de corps*. On the other hand, any outfit noted for its rigid but just discipline will invariably have it. Proper discipline will insure that all the members of the group present a neat and military appearance, not only in so far as haircuts, shined leather, and clean, well pressed uniforms go, but also in the carriage of the individual, the way he looks you in the eye, the way he walks, and so forth."

Johnny chuckled and said, "I'll always remember an old gunnery sergeant we had. Whenever we marched, he used to growl, 'Don't just walk, damn it, strut!'

"Incidentally, that's another way discipline helps build *esprit de corps*. By this I mean looking out for your NCOs. We should treat our NCOs with the proper dignity and respect ourselves, and require all of the officers and men under us to do the same. By doing this, we will help the NCO have more pride in himself and, since he will feel that he is an important member of the Corps, he will also have more pride in the Corps. By having more pride in the Corps, he will be more zealous in protecting its honor and reputation.

"Yes," Johnny continued, "discipline does help *esprit de corps* and, on the other hand, *esprit de corps* helps discipline. That is why, for example, a real marine will not condone a slovenly appearance or a yard bird attitude in another marine. He naturally feels that since they are both members of the same group they must both respect and achieve the standard of the group. Having *esprit de corps*, he refuses to lower himself to the level of the yard bird. The only alternative left is for the yard bird to mend his ways and raise himself to the standard of the group."

"THAT MAKES ME THINK of another way we can develop and protect *esprit de corps*," Dusty said enthusiastically. "Unfortunately we do have a few indifferent yard birds hanging around in these postwar days. We should all make it a practice to immediately criticize any one of these characters that we encounter. Too often we think to ourselves, 'He's a tramp, but he isn't in my company so I'll skip it.' The fact remains, however, that he is in our Marine Corps and should, therefore, be made to meet the standards of the Corps as a whole. The sooner we change these indifferent bums into marines, the better it will be for the *esprit de corps*. By 'we,' my friends, I mean particularly we junior officers. Since we have closer contact with the men than do the more senior officers, it is not only our duty, but also our privilege to do this service for the Corps as a whole."

"Along the same line," Johnny spoke up, "you must be very careful that such a yard bird does not become the clown of the outfit. Once the younger men begin to be amused at his appearance or attitude, they will imitate him. Before you know it, you'll have a lot of them running around with their shirt tails out or their trousers rolled up, or forgetting their military courtesies. Like Dusty just said, the sooner we crack down on these bums the better."

Tex nodded and said, "Another way to develop *esprit de corps* is by means of group activities. For example, sports. In your organized athletics, don't allow choosing of sides. Require that squads play as teams and have platoon and company teams compete with other outfits. This will help the *esprit de corps* because it will help the individual to identify himself with a group and get all of the members used to thinking and playing as a group.

"In the same manner, training helps develop *esprit de corps*, particularly such group achievement training as long hikes, close order drill, and over-night bivouacs."

"Company and battalion parties help along the same line," Dusty smiled. "Of course, the prize example of how a party helps develop and protect the *esprit de corps* of the Marine Corps is our annual Birthday Party."

"Yes," Johnny laughed, "although you're getting pretty close to another method I was going to name."

"What's that? Customs and courtesies?" Dusty asked.

"Roger!" Johnny said. "Strict observance of customs and courtesies by all hands will protect the *esprit de corps* we now have and will also help to develop it even more."

"How?" Boat Space inquired.

"Well, customs are, of course, practices or courses of action which have become accepted conventions or rules," Dusty said when Johnny nodded to him to answer Boat Space. "Since these customs are common to the group, in this case the Marine Corps, they help to create a feeling of common action within the group and in doing so aid *esprit de corps.*

"Customs also make up a large part of our tradition and therefore help in that respect.

"Courtesies help in the same manner; as a matter of fact, many courtesies are also customs or vice versa."

"Well," Boat Space said, knitting his brow in his unaccustomed mental effort, "I can see where some customs might help *esprit de corps.* For instance, the old custom or tradition, whatever you geniuses want to call it, of one marine never letting down another marine would certainly help the old *esprit.*"

"You know, Boat Space," Johnny said, "in the opinion of one of our more intelligent young captains it's not so much a case of one marine not letting another marine down as it is a case of one marine not wanting another marine or anyone else to get ahead of him."

"Well, whichever it is," Dusty laughed, "it certainly is apparent that this old customs helps *esprit de corps.*

"Incidentally, I feel that frequent informal discussions of the Corps history is also a valuable means of developing and maintaining *esprit de corps.* I say *informal* because I think that a regular lecture or speech by some officer to an entire company or battalion usually falls flat unless the officer is a gifted speaker. On the other hand, if the officer holds informal discussions with his NCOs and encourages them to have informal discussions among themselves and with the men under them, he will accomplish a great deal."

"A GOOD POINT, Dusty," Johnny said enthusiastically. "While you were talking I thought of another good way to develop and keep strong our *espirit de corps.* Maybe I'm a nut on this passing of information down as well as up the line, but I think it is just as important in this case as it is in combat. By this I mean that timely and regular information as to what the rest of the Marine Corps is doing should be made available to all hands. Of course, that is why we have our HEADQUARTERS BULLETIN, the GAZETTE and LEATHERNECK, and the various post and organization newspapers. Since we have the means at hand, we can do our part by seeing that these publications have the widest distribution possible."

"Well," Tex drawled, "we've now covered the meaning of *esprit de corps,* why the Marine Corps has it, and how we as officers can develop it further and protect what we have. Just to be a 'party pooper' let me ask you this, why should we bother to develop it and/or protect it?"

Oh, well, he's not one of my men . . .

"We owe something to the birds who were marines before us for building us such a reputation," Dusty smiled. "If we foster *esprit de corps* in ourselves and those under us it will make it easier and more certain for us to fulfill any obligation we may feel towards those who have gone before us."

"Not to mention those who died for their buddies and their Marine Corps," Johnny said softly, and we could all see that he was thinking of his Dad.

"I think another reason why we should bother," Johnny continued after a minute, "is that it helps us individually. It's easy to see, and we've all experienced how it gives us courage in battle. Furthermore, it gives solace in discouragement, in lonesomeness, yes, even in despair. It helps us do what we know to be right.

"It's time for chow, but here's one thought I'd like to leave with you birds before we knock off this discussion because I think it's the finest tribute to our *esprit de corps* and what it accomplishes. There has never been a case of treason or mutiny in the history of the Marine Corps. No other service can make such a boast." USMC

Intelligence from the Skies

By LtCol R. C. Burns

IN THE SUMMER OF 1940 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE WAS faced with a serious problem. France had fallen and invasion of England was considered high on the list of enemy capabilities. Into Hitler's hands with France had gone the "listening posts" of the Low Countries and Scandinavia. No longer could intelligence agents filter across conveniently located neutral borders in the time honored manner to seek and report information of the enemy.

With invasion of her own shores an imminent possibility and her army still reeling from the blow received at Dunkirk, Britain needed information of the enemy and needed it urgently. A new source had to be found. In this crisis the Royal Air Force presented a solution—a solution which was to revolutionize the production of intelligence for strategic planning — long range aerial photographic reconnaissance.

Since the closing days of World War I, aerial photographic reconnaissance had been regarded in military circles as one source of information, and brief instruction in interpretation had been included in routine courses on map reading. But such photographs were considered to be of tactical value only and interpretation was confined largely to terrain studies.

RAF Spitfires made reconnaissance flights as far eastward as Berlin and Stettin on Baltic Coast.

The RAF's plan was simple in concept. Spitfires, among the best of fighter planes of those days in speed and maneuverability, were stripped of their armament to compensate for the weight of range-increasing extra fuel tanks and were equipped with automatic cameras capable of taking 250 exposures without reloading.

With no weapons for self defense, the pilot was forced to rely upon evasive action in the face of the enemy. However, with his speed and maneuverability, operating at an altitude of 10,000 to 12,000 feet which was generally satisfactory for the accomplishment of his mission, the pilot could normally approach his target, make his photographic run and turn for home undetected, or at least before effective countermeasures could be taken.

THE EXTRA FUEL LOAD gave the photographic Spitfires a maximum range of approximately 1600 miles. Thus the first Photographic Reconnaissance Unit (PRU), based in central England, could include within its operating radius southern Norway, Denmark, Germany as far eastwardly as Berlin and Stettin on the Baltic coast, northern Italy and all of France. To exploit their range, additional PRUs were stationed in northern Scotland and in Cornwall. Overseas units were established later.

PRU pilots were former fighter pilots especially trained for their new mission. From the start their operations were successful, although weather and the enemy combined to take their toll of casualties. On one occasion in 1941, for four consecutive days a PRU plane took off for a sortie over the Kiel Canal. Only the fourth returned.

In order to glean the maximum amount of information from the photographs taken by PRU pilots, interpretation demanded highly trained specialists with diversified knowledge in many fields. In addition to a cadre of skilled personnel selected from its own rosters and borrowed from the Army and Navy, the RAF commissioned a number of civilian experts, both men and women, each chosen because of his or her specific background and aptitude.

One such was the archaeologist recruited for his intimate acquaintance with the Middle East. When other interpreters were baffled by a number of small, irregularly spaced heaps scattered over the sands of a desert in which enemy activity was suspected, one glance sufficed to solve the mystery. "Camel dung," announced the savant with finality.

When France fell to Hitler's forces, the listening posts of the lowlands were gone and England urgently needed information of the enemy. The RAF presented a solution with intelligence from long range aerial photographic reconnaissance

Interpreters were prepared for their tasks by a concentrated one month course in the RAF Photographic School at a small town in Buckinghamshire, and then posted to various duty stations.

Interpretation was divided into three successive phases. Speed was the keynote of the First Phase. As a returning PRU plane rolled to a stop on its home runway, its film was removed and rushed to the field laboratory for developing. Meanwhile the First Phase interpreter interrogated the pilot. He next placed the newly developed strip negative, still wet, on a viewer and made a hasty perusal, calling for prints when necessary, to seek information which might require immediate action.

Typical of such information initiating immediate action was the absence from an enemy port of a capital vessel previously known to have been there, or the presence of a newly assembled flotilla of "invasion barges" in some estuary along the Channel coast. It was First Phase interpretation which first disclosed the departure from a Norwegian fjord of the battleship *Bismarck* on her last voyage. A dispatch to the Air Ministry concluded the First Phase interpreter's task.

SECOND PHASE INTERPRETATION was done by the Central Interpretation Unit (CIU), located in the Thames valley near the original PRU field. As soon as the First Phase was completed, prints of the entire strip were made and dispatched from the PRU station to CIU—by "van" or by plane from the outlying units. Thus the Second Phase, operating in shifts on a 24-hour schedule, could be under way within a matter of hours from the time of completion of the Spitfire's sortie.

Interpreters were divided into groups, each of which received all photographs covering targets in its assigned geographical area. A stereoscopic study was made of the entire strip and findings compared with those resulting from the last sortie over the same terrain. Frequency of coverage of any given area depended upon its strategic importance.

The Second Phase report on each sortie recorded all information of a general nature, both positive and negative, gained from its study—indications or lack of indications of enemy ground, sea and air activity. Again it was a matter only of hours before the phase was completed and the report en route to the Air Ministry for evaluation, interpretation and dissemination.

Third Phase interpretation, also carried on at CIU, involved a deliberate and searching study by the most highly qualified specialist personnel available. Divided eventually into 12 sections according to specialty, these interpreters were assigned pertinent parts of a sortie after the Second Phase had been completed. Third Phase reports, like those of the Second Phase, were forwarded to the Air Ministry for action.

The aerodrome section of Third Phase was composed of interpreters with expert knowledge of air operations in general and of the Luftwaffe in particular. A constant study of enemy airfields detected shifts in the air order of battle and resultant indications of forthcoming moves. Influx of Heinkels to certain forward fields was sure to bring the blitz to certain areas in Britain. Newly constructed dispersal bays of a characteristically German type photographed in Syria by a Cairo based PRU plane gave the first indication of probable Nazi air support for the Vichy forces then in that country.

Estimation of German plane production was the mission of the Aircraft Section. Here personnel skilled in all phases of aircraft manufacture calculated the capacity of enemy plants by computing from photographs the size of

Air fields were watched for concentration of Nazi planes to shifts in strength of German Luftwaffe.





Railroad marshalling yards were carefully watched for significant rail movements of men and material.

each and applying a formula based on unit production for the type of plane known to be manufactured there. This section was more than once the source of first information on new models.

In the Army Section were interpreters from that service. Military installations and troop dispositions were scrutinized for indications of invasion attempts. Later, the focus shifted to coastal defenses as the British began to strike back with commando raids.

Results of RAF raids over the Continent were reported in detail by the Bomb Damage Assessment Section. Men who had been building contractors or engineers in civilian life, assisted by others with a first hand acquaintance with the areas concerned, computed in detail the extent of damage after each raid and estimated the time needed for effective repair of vital facilities. If one were interested, he might also learn that the Bierstube at 111 Horst Wessel Platz in Hamburg, operated according to the 1939 city directory by Herr Wolfgang Stuepnagel who lived upstairs with his wife Frieda, had been unfortunate enough to catch a direct hit the night before.

HEADED BY an officer of the WAAF (Women's Auxiliary Air Force) who had been an interior decorator, the Camouflage Section was staffed by personnel whose talents were on the artistic side. Their background knowledge of the application of light, shadow and color was put to good use in the detection of new methods of camouflage, always a strong point with the Germans.

The Communications Section was concerned with the two major means of inland transport — railways and canals. Ex-civilian railroaders, some with continental experience, watched marshalling yards and "nodal" or key junctions for significant rail movements of men and materiel. Their task, particularly in relation to troop shifts, was facilitated by the methodical ways so typical of the Germans. A battalion of infantry was always transported by a train consisting of a never varying number of passenger and freight cars; similarly, each Nazi tactical unit had its own blatantly distinctive combination of cars. Large scale movement of troop trains from western Europe toward the East was one of the indications of the forthcoming attack on Russia and of the size of the forces involved.

Highly important as a means of freight transport throughout western Germany and the occupied countries were complex canal systems. To analyze barge traffic and recommend key points for air attack the Communications Section depended upon two RAF officers who had spent their university holidays canoeing on continental canals. An old hobby paid big dividends in a manner that was characteristic of CIU.

IN THE EARLY DAYS of British bombing raids over Europe, follow-up photographic reconnaissance frequently showed that the bombs had missed their targets by comfortable margins. It was customary procedure for the bombers to guide on ground fires, presumably started by a bomb dropped by the first plane to reach the target area. Comparison of pilots' reports eventually disclosed that in many cases fires were already burning upon approach of the attackers. It was then discovered that the enemy had prepared installations, apparently oil burning, in the general vicinity but at a safe distance from all principal target areas to act as decoys. When the raiders had been picked up by radar and their course determined, their arrival over the target was calculated and the fires started at the proper time to lead them astray. CIU interpreters uncovered the characteristic appearance of the decoy installations and a Decoy Section was established in Third Phase to detect and plot their exact locations. Thereafter, there was a marked increase in bomb damage.

It was the task of the Flak Section to spot antiaircraft artillery positions and locate them by geographic coordinates. Thus was kept an accurate and up to date chart of all antiaircraft defenses from the elaborate flak towers of Berlin's Tiergarten to the Channel coastal batteries.

The work of the Industry Section was similar to that of the Aircraft Section, but far wider in scope, covering as it did all industries in Germany and the occupied countries, with the exception of aircraft and ship building. Here again were gathered experts picked from civilian life because of their intimate knowledge of various in-

The Navy section kept close tabs on ship building and significant moves of naval and merchant ships.

dustrial processes and specific acquaintance with continental industries. One of these interpreters had spent ten peacetime years working in a Paris automobile factory, currently producing for the Nazis; another as a salesman for an English equipment firm had many times visited all the important steel plants in the Ruhr and knew his way from front door to back of each. It was the mission of this section not only to keep tab on production, but also to recommend as targets industrial plants whose products were essential to the continued operation of other industries in order that a few well placed bombs might have far reaching consequences.

THE NAVY SECTION was staffed by officers of the Royal Navy and specialists in ship building and merchant shipping. Movements of all capital vessels of Hitler's navy were logged. Particularly close watch was kept on the *Prinz Eugen*, *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, tied up at Brest for months following the sinking of the *Bismarck* in May 1941. On one occasion, close study showed certain changes in the camouflage which had attempted to conceal the *Scharnhorst*. Further investigation revealed that she was no longer at her customary berth, but had been replaced by a cleverly altered tanker. Fearing a foray against Atlantic shiping, the RAF launched widespread reconnaissance at once and soon found the missing battle cruiser in the harbor of La Pallice several hundred miles down the coast. Bombing attacks were unsuccessful, but forced her to flee back to the safer shelter of Brest.

Volume and trends of Nazi ship building, with particular emphasis on submarines, were closely observed by the specialists in the Navy Section, new construction being followed from laying of the keel to trial runs. Especially adept at identifying types of ships was one interpreter who had illustrated Jane's "Fighting Ships" in pre-war days.

Even John Q. Public had his day in Third Phase. Public relations officers operated the Press Section, culling from the sorties pictures which had reader appeal and could be released without jeopardizing security. And at the end of each day, the best shots were sent to 10 Downing Street for the Prime Minister's scrapbook, for Winston Churchill was one of CIU's most enthusiastic fans.

THE WIRELESS SECTION included communication experts who concentrated their attention on enemy radio and RDF (radar) installations. In one case, when interception of British raids on the Paris industrial area had been unusually effective, the Wireless Section laid the blime on an RDF station located at Bruneval on the Channel coast. Air attack being ineffective, a commando raid put the station out of action once and for all. Success of the raid had been ensured by rehearsals based upon information of enemy defenses supplied by the Army Section of Third Phase, as well as knowledge of the exact location and details of construction of the station furnished by the Wireless Section.

Thus from the necessity of 1940 was developed a source which was to play so important a part in the production of intelligence in the subsequent stages of the war both in Europe and in the Pacific. By the summer of 1941, a scattering of United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers began to appear among the students at the Photographic Interpretation School. They went on to do "post graduate" work at CIU and then returned to set up the first interpretation schools after the RAF pattern at Harrisburg, Anacostia and Quantico.

Works of the Japanese from Guadalcanal to Tokyo eventually came under the stereoscopic scrutiny of interpreters who went to the Pacific. There, although the situation did not normally demand the many ramifications of the original CIU, particularly the refinements of its Third Phase, ocean vastness interposed a barrier to the collection of information similar in effect to that raised by enemy action against the British in 1940. Again the obstacle was overcome by the camera eyes of photographic reconnaissance planes. Of these, Marines flew their share, outstanding among their operations being the sortie over Truk by PBYs of VMD 254 in early February of 1944. From those photographs was produced the intelligence essential to the success of the Fifth Fleet's spectacular raid against that supposedly impregnable enemy base to cover the seizure of Eniwetok. USMC

In Brief

The private is no longer low man in the Army. On 1 August the low man became a "recruit" with the former private becoming a private first class. The new classifications, accompanied by a change in types of chevrons denoting grade, are part of several changes based on the Army's "career plan" for promotion of enlisted men. All first sergeants and master sergeants become master sergeants. All technical sergeants become sergeants first class. Staff sergeants and technicians third grade become sergeants. Sergeants and technicians fourth grade become corporals. Corporals and technicians fifth grade become privates first class, and privates first class will be known as privates with the former privates taking low man honors as recruits.

A group of *Air Force officers will be trained in aircraft carrier flying* this summer for the first time in history, the Navy announced recently. The officers will report to the commander of the Navy's Atlantic fleet air arm for 130 days of training in naval air operations. The training will include take-offs and landings aboard carriers. The Air Force pilots will take part in carrier operations during the fall exercises of the Atlantic fleet.

The Chief of Army Field Forces is considering the possibility of sending replacements to overseas stations in organized units rather than as individuals. Replacement officers would be in charge of the units and would continue the training of the replacements while aboard ship. This would augment the present sketchy eight weeks of basic training and would provide command control over replacements until they arrived at replacement installations overseas. The proposed system is quite similar to the Marine Corps' replacement battalions, used most of the last war.

The Navy has abruptly canceled a recent Bureau of Ordnance directive authorizing the disposal of obsolete and surplus guns, gun mounts, missile launchers, and their ammunition, together with all components for their utilization and control thereof. "No further scrapping, mutilation, or disposal action shall be accomplished except as indicated," Navy Secretary John L. Sullivan stated.

The $1,937,000,000 the Air Force has earmarked for new plane procurement will buy 243 bombers, 1,575 jet fighters, and 909 reconnaissance, transport, training, rescue, and liaison aircraft, and will give the Air Force a big push toward its 70 group goal. First job is to replace existing obsolescent and obsolete aircraft with modern bombers and fighters, and modernizing aircraft now in production. The Air Force expects first delivery on new planes in January 1949. By July 1950 it expects to have received 2,100 of the projected 2,727 planes.

Vest-pocket size signal equipment, candy-bar sized batteries, cigarette-package sized radio receivers and senders—all kinds of portable radar and radiosonde gear have stream-lined Signal Corps communications equipment far beyond even World War II standards. There are two reasons for developing smaller, lighter—and more efficient—communications equipment. One is the demand for greater facility in handling equipment and with fewer men. The other is to provide the combat soldier with equipment that won't make him a conspicuous target on the battlefield.

The Navy has ordered 20 additional HO3S observation helicopters from the Sikorsky Division, United Aircraft Corporation, in line with plans to equip Navy fleet units with helicopters for rescue, transport, and observation missions. A total of 46 HO3S's are now on order. They will bring to 88 the total number of helicopters of all types available for use by Navy fleet and shore-based units and will give the Navy a fleet of rotary-winged aircraft second to none.

Three more wartime combat squadrons were recommissioned in the Marine Corps Air Reserve recently to bring the total number of Leatherneck reserve fighter squadrons to the authorized 27, Marine Corps Headquarters announced recently. Two of the squadrons, VMF-232 in New York and VMF-111 at Dallas, Texas, were the second fighter squadrons established in each city but the commissioning of VMF-231 at Akron, Ohio brought to 22 the number of cities having Marine Reserve squadrons. Besides the 27 fighter units, the Marine Air Reserve has eight radar ground controlled intercept squadrons.

Direct commissions in the Army JAGD as first lieutenants or captains will be offered qualified lawyers who have creditable records as commissioned officers on active Federal service in any of the Armed Forces for at least a year, or who are honor or distinguished military graduates of the senior division of ROTC. Applicants without previous military service may compete for commissions in a one-year tour of duty. Qualified reserve officers now on extended active duty may also apply for Regular Army commissions in the JAGD.

One of the ladders of the enlisted career plan will be in Public Information, the Army has announced. The plan calls for three-year enlistment of qualified men direct from civilian life for training in all phases of journalism, radio, and public information work. The Army hopes to give its PI men a three-month period of on-the-job training with newspaper editors, radio station managers, and television station operators. Then the soldiers will be assigned to public information jobs throughout the Army.

Additional training innovations tested in the Army's Universal Military Training Experimental Unit at Fort Knox, Ky., will henceforth be applied to all Army recruit training. Last year, capitalizing upon lessons learned in the Fort Knox "laboratory," orders emphasizing the instructor-student relationship were issued.

The Army Ordnance Department has been using a "can opener" in recent months to inspect some of its "canned" guns and other items to determine whether their storage in metal containers has preserved them effectively. Spot checks have shown the guns to be in excellent condition and ready, almost without exception, for immediate use.

An inspection test to measure the operational effectiveness of all U. S. Air Force tactical and supporting units is being conducted in many USAF units as part of routine training. The tests, referred to as "operational readiness tests," measure the combat readiness of each unit with scorings used for comparison with other similar units. In grading the tested organizations, a majority of points are allotted to operations, with others for training, maintenance, personnel, supply, and administration.

The Navy is developing a guided missile to knock down enemy planes more than seven miles away. The rocket-propelled missile, which will ride a radio beam to targets 5,000 to 15,000 yards from the mother ship, will be ready for fleet installation by 1950. The Navy is also developing a bigger and better bazooka for the Marines. The standard 2.36 inch bazooka will be replaced by a 3.5 inch bazooka for antitank defense and close support fire.

A squad of 12 marines under a non-commissioned officer has been ordered by the Navy to the United States Consulate General in Jerusalem to supplement civilian guards. The marines were drawn from the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Command, and are the first U. S. service men to be sent to Palestine for guard duty. The detail will provide protection and security for representatives and property of the U. S. Government.

The Navy will accept about 2,000 cadets in its Naval Aviation Cadet Program during the coming fiscal year, and will continue with large yearly quotas thereafter. The program authorized in 1942 is being re-implemented to insure a continuous flow into the flight training facilities, to man the Fleet Air Groups with young aviators, and to provide a supply of newly trained personnel for the Naval Reserves.

A new five place helicopter, incorporating many new design factors, has been developed by the Sikorsky Division of United Aircraft Corporation for the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics. The new craft, designated the XHJS-1, has been designed primarily for utility, rescue, and observation work aboard aircraft carriers, battleships, and cruisers. The craft is equipped with all-metal rotor blades, and other firsts include an improved engine-cooling system, nylon fuel cells instead of metal tanks, and a shock-mounted tail pylon which gives full head clearance under the tail rotor blades.

Testing armor plate cooled to low temperatures has recently been undertaken at the Naval Proving Grounds, Dahlgren, Va. In one of the tests 5-inch steel armor is subjected to minus 70 degrees Fahrenheit in one of the Navy's cold chambers for 24 hours. Then it is packed in dry ice and rushed to a near-by range where it is fired upon to test its resistance at extreme cold.

Defense in Towns

By LtCol R. C. Williams, Jr, Inf

HISTORY ABOUNDS WITH INNUMERABLE EXAMPLES of battles waged for towns and villages. Indeed, some of our troops have had to batter down the same walls, destroy the same fortifications, and reduce the same observation points in Sicily, Italy, and France that the soldier of several centuries ago came up against in days long since past. Towns have been the backbone of defense throughout the ages. Their reduction was necessary to break the German defenses in 1917-1918, and the same was true in World War II. The fact also remains that the defended town is still one of the most dangerous and toughest objectives to capture. The defended town proved its value as a sort of tank-proof island during the Spanish Civil War several years ago, as the operation of tanks in a town was very limited and canalized and this factor certainly added to its importance in the recent war. It has been said—and it certainly is true—that towns are conspicuous topographical features which are easily shelled or bombed. It is equally true that detailed information relative to a town or village can be obtained quite easily. But it has been forcefully proven in World War II that these weaknesses do not prevent towns from being powerful potential defensive positions. For examples of the military value of towns in the recent conflict, one needs only to refer to the successful defense of Stalingrad, or to the amount of time and effort which our own troops expended in the reduction of towns in Sicily and Italy, where the Germans were determined to hold certain towns until the last possible moment. Catania, Troina, Ortona, San Vittore, or San Pietro may not register immediately in some peoples' minds, but the fight for Cassino should in the minds of all of us. Later, in France and Belgium, towns were still key defensive points and key objectives. We know of defended towns that have been bombed from the air continuously and then subjected to ceaseless artillery barrage. We also know that, after the smoke had cleared and the dust had settled, the infantryman still had to go in and fight for that town. Cassino proved to the world that blasting and shelling may change a town into an unrecognizable mass of rubble, but it doesn't detract from its defensive value. In fact, the Russians maintained that this bombing and artillery fire actually increased the defensive value of Stalingrad in many ways. In all cases, the resultant wreckage and debris was a hindrance to the free movement of enemy armor, assault guns, and personnel, and added to the problems of control and communications for the Germans.

Now our own doctrine, as well as that of the Germans, advocated the employment of towns as key points in the defensive set-up, especially when an enemy mechanized attack was to be expected. We still hold to that idea. Of course, this doctrine specifies that towns selected for defense must be strategically located so as to make a direct attack necessary, not those situated where they may be easily by-passed, surrounded, or isolated. Moreover, the size of the town is not a deciding factor. The real deciding factors are its geographic location, its economic importance, and its physical make-up. Several questions must be answered before a town should be defended. Is it on a piece of high ground, which commands a pass or defile? Is it along a main route of advance? Does it possess resources essential to the war effort or contain important industrial installations? Does it consist primarily of buildings constructed of substantial materials which will resist enemy action, especially incendiary action? Towns with these characteristics will prove to be tremendously effective in any defensive situation. They can be developed into highly effective tank-proof islands of resistance. They will provide an obstacle which will aid materially in severing the cohesion of the enemy attack. They place all the advantages on the side of the defender as each building is a potential fort which provides such concealment that the attacker is unable to tell which of the buildings are lightly held and which are heavily defended. As a result of this lack of

Defended towns have been the backbone of defense throughout the ages. Their reduction was necessary to break German defenses in 1917-18, and in World War II. They still remain the toughest and most dangerous objectives to capture

information on the part of the attacker, fire is often dispersed, ammunition wasted, and his forces improperly employed.

Towns are also very valuable in delaying actions. They keep the attacker in ignorance of the strength of the forces opposing his advance. They also, in most cases, provide cover and concealment for screening a withdrawal. They provide shelter for the defender against air bombardment and artillery fire with their basements, sewers, or prepared bombproof shelters. Thus, the attacker is confronted with a defending force that has not been decimated, as has been hoped, by the air bombings or artillery fires. When the attacker does enter the town, the close proximity of the opposing forces will limit even further the effectiveness of close air or artillery support. Then, too, when the attacker moves in, his ability to maneuver is greatly restricted.

In view of the importance of towns from the military viewpoint, it is therefore necessary that we know how to plan their defenses. In order to become familiar with the principles involved, let us analyze the defense of a town which figured prominently in the recent war. Figure 1 is the plan of the Town. Figure 2 shows the boundaries, the main line of resistance, and the rifle company dispositions. The sectors of responsibility are clearly defined for the boundaries are along streets. The assignment of the battalion areas insures depth, mutual support, and all-around protection of the defensive position.

THE LOCATION of the main line of resistance illustrates another principle. Inasmuch as the edge of the town is a logical place for the artillery to register, the MLR should not be placed there. On the other hand, if it is situated well inside the Town, the fields of fire of the automatic weapons will become a major problem and the enemy in the meantime will be given the opportunity to secure a substantial toe-hold in the town. The main line of resistance, as shown on the sketch, seems to strike the midpoint of these two extreme locations in that it has been placed in the suburbs of the town. However, the location for the MLR in most cases necessitated the clearing of buildings, walls, fences, etc., to secure fields of fire as in any normal situation. The bulk of the troops along this MLR occupied positions on the ground level or lower floors of buildings so as to gain maximum grazing fire. Some snipers were placed in the upper floors.

The location of the limiting points at street intersections were chosen so as to make mutual coordination between the adjacent units an easy matter.

Figure 3 shows one of the battalion areas of defense. Unit defense areas have been established and the supporting weapons have been attached to the unit. This brings out another principle—that of control. Once the battle commences, control by the higher commander is very difficult to maintain, due to the lack of observation and the difficulty of maintaining communication, and so decentralization of control to the lower commanders appears to be the best solution.

IT SHOULD NOT be assumed, however, that each and every building in these unit defense areas were occupied. Experience has proven that it is not wise to occupy and defend every house. Instead, certain key buildings were transformed into fortified strongholds with, of course, alternate and supplementary possibilities. Several of these selected buildings formed a strong point or defense area. The buildings chosen were designated because of their possibilities for fields of fire, for opportunities for mutual support, and also for the amount of protection they afforded against enemy action. All were built of stone or concrete. It is worth noting that the Germans, in Russia, used churches and railway stations as



Figure 1
Plan of the Town
Scale 1:20,000



Figure 2
Boundaries and the MLR
Scale 1:20,000

important strong points. These buildings usually are made of some type of masonry, provide good observation points, and, in the case of railway stations, good fields of fire are normally assured in at least two directions. These defense areas, formed by mutually supporting buildings, have been distributed in depth so as to provide for the fires of each crossing the front or flanks of the neighboring units.

THE TELEGRAPH EXCHANGE has been included within a strongly defended area. This is in accord with the principle that all public utilities should be protected so as to insure their use by the defender. Incidentally, the German doctrine was that these buildings would not be defended from within but rather from advance positions around them.

The commander of each defense area was ordered to secure the exact range from his area to key points in all directions, including other strong points. This provides for all-around defense, and in the event one of the strong points was taken, concentrated fire from many of the other strong points could be brought to bear upon it immediately.

The regimental commander who was given the task of defending the town had his westernmost battalion in position to be able to defend the flanks and rear of the town, thus preventing any possibility of encirclement. He also had the reserve battalion ready to counterattack any penetrating elements. While awaiting action, the reserve occupied sheltered buildings and cellars. Covered routes of approach were made by cutting passageways through buildings, so as to eliminate the possibility of receiving excessive casualties while moving up for the counterattack.

In some cases, such as at Stalingrad, sewers were used as covered routes of approach and the defenders were able to move for blocks at a time without exposing themselves. At Cassino, on the other hand, an old tunnel was employed. In the larger cities, subways might provide the cover.

In the defense of a town, as in a normal defensive situation, the defending forces are divided into security forces, holding forces, and a reserve. In the defense of this town all approaches to the town were prepared by the security elements. Road blocks, barricades, mines, pillboxes, and wire entanglements were prepared by all three elements of the defending force.

It is true that the number and types of obstacles employed are limited only by the equipment available and the ingenuity of the defender, if he has adequate time for preparation. As a matter of fact there is quite likely to be a wider variety of materials at hand for constructing barricades in a town than in the field. In this defensive situation tank barricades were improved by blowing large craters in the streets, overturning vehicles, demolishing walls of buildings, and using steel girders from wrecked buildings. All obstacles were covered by fire.

AS IN ALL COMBAT in towns, the civilian problem was an important one which necessitated an immediate solution. Inasmuch as the inhabitants of a town are always a liability, needing food, water, and medical attention when the battle commences, and the defender risks security in regard to his defensive installation and plans, if the civilians are allowed to remain, the regimental commander decided in this case to evacuate all civilians immediately. He therefore removed the problem of civil administration and supply by this decision.

Communication is always a problem. It was solved in this situation by: first, taking over and operating the local telephone system; second, supplementing it by a military wire system, which was underground wherever possible. All telephone lines between various installations were laid in triplicate over three different routes. Decentralization of control guarded against failure in the event the communication system broke down, but it was imperative that nothing prevent the proper employment of the reserve force at the proper location. The radio was found to be undependable in the center of town. With the dust and smoke of battle, it was realized that pyrotechnics could not be depended upon either. It was therefore decided that an efficient messenger system would be set up. Messengers were made thoroughly familiar with the locations of all command posts and the routes thereto, and were required to traverse the routes frequently by day and by night.


Security Forces, composed of one platoon per rifle company of the reserve battalion, engineers, and intelligence units are operating to the front and flanks.
Figure 3
1st Battalion Dispositions
Scale 1:10,000

Supply also was an important consideration in the defense of the town. It was realized that, once the town was attacked, supply routes would be difficult to maintain. Therefore, ammunition, rations, water, and medical supplies were stocked in each defense area in sufficient quantities to enable the defenders to supply themselves for a prolonged period of time in case their position was isolated.

The commander of the defending force realized that a successful defense of the town would depend in a large degree upon his plan of fires. Work was therefore continually on the plan of fire to insure a skillful coordinated use of all weapons.

This plan of fire is the key to the whole defense of the town, so it might be advantageous to examine it in more detail. In the first place, the Infantry battalion was given a platoon of 57mm AT Guns from the Regimental Antitank Company, a platoon of 105mm self-propelled howitzers from the Cannon Company, and a platoon of engineers from the attached Engineer Company. The regiment kept the artillery under its control in a centrally located position where it could mass its fire in any threatened direction.

With these attachments in mind, let us jump to the rifle platoons, inasmuch as they form the basis for the strong points. We see on Figure 3 that each of the rifle companies of the 1st Bn have three platoon strong points. These strong points consisted of one rifle platoon, one 60mm mortar squad, and one 57mm antitank gun squad, and were self-sustaining units.

The squad areas were assigned by designation of specific buildings to each squad leader by the platoon leader. The buildings in each area not to be occupied were either destroyed or booby trapped. Alternate positions were selected and routes prepared for the 57mm gun so that it could defend against attack from any direction. The heavy machine guns were located by the Heavy Weapons Company commander and were placed inside platoon areas. The light machine guns and BARs were also located so as to aid in providing all-around fire for the strong point. Work on each platoon position went ahead without a halt. The personnel were divided into two shifts, while half the men worked to improve the defensive installations, and acted as sentries, the remainder rested. Observation posts were manned at all times and they covered all possible routes of approach. Incidentally, observation posts were duplicated in each area, for it was logically assumed that the enemy would destroy some by fire and smoke others.

THE PLAN OF FIRE therefore called for a machine gun final protective line around the entire town. In addition to this, the battalions had a final protective line around them, as did the rifle platoons. The mortars, cannon, and artillery were prepared to fire in any direction and had actually registered to insure against any possibility of error in calculations. The 81mm mortar sections of each 81mm mortar platoon were attached to rifle companies for better control. The 105mm howitzer sections attached to each battalion were the battalion commander's weapons to use as he saw fit.

As has been said before, the work on the defensive areas never stopped. The infantry soldier laid the mines, strung up the tactical wire, constructed the obstacles, pillboxes and barricades. It was he who did the camouflage work. He had to take care of the details. In every case firing positions were selected with a view to having surprise fire from an unexpected place. Tin cans were placed on wire to warn of enemy approach. Ambushes were prepared for tanks and armored vehicles. Antipersonnel mines were placed in all probable avenues of approach, including culverts, backyards not being used, and empty buildings. Dummy positions for crew served weapons were prepared and camouflaged.

While this work progressed active reconnaissance was continually going on to the front and flanks of the town. Every precaution was taken to guard against surprise.

So much then for the defense of the town. It is hoped that the discussion of this specific example will demonstrate the need for careful detailed planning, skillful coordination of automatic weapons, and the constant attention to details, if the defense of a town is to be successful. Towns have been and are being defended with great success. A proper appreciation by the infantryman of the principles involved in such a defense, therefore, is not only desirable, but is a necessary part of his military training.

USMC

VAL GUNFIRE AT GUAM

By Comdr I. E. McMillan

THE GUNFIRE SUPPORT PLAN FOR THE ATTACK UPON Guam was first outlined in early April 1944, at the Pearl Harbor headquarters of RearAdm R. L. Conolly, ComGroup Three, 5th PhibFor (later ComGroup Three, PhibsPac). Only a hasty consideration of the gunfire support details was possible at this time since the Landing Force Commander, MajGen Roy S. Geiger, and all the troops were located at Guadalcanal. When the Admiral learned that he was to command the Guam attack force, he departed for Guadalcanal, via air, as soon as possible, in order to establish his headquarters close to that of Gen Geiger.

It was decided by the Central Pacific high command that the assault upon Guam would be the southern prong of a bifurcated attack upon the Marianas. (The northern prong to be at Saipan-Tinian.) Adm Conolly was to be in overall command at Guam as Commander Task Force 53 (CTF 53). The landing force troops were to come from 1st Marine Amphibious Corps (later III AC), commanded by MajGen Geiger, with a title for the operation as CG, Southern Troops and Landing Force. (Later on certain elements of the 77th Army Division, brought from Hawaii, were assigned as corps reserve.) There were to be two main attack groups. The Northern Attack Group, under Adm Conolly, was to land MajGen Allen H. Turnage's 3d Marine Division in the Asan area while the Southern Attack Group, under RearAdm L. F. Reifsnider, would land BrigGen Lemuel C. Shepherd's 1st Provisional Marine Brigade over the beaches at Agat.

Adm Conolly left Pearl Harbor on 14 April for Guadalcanal. His object was to get acquainted with his principal troop commanders and to commence the detailed

Guam was softened up for 13 days prior to W-Day. Enemy guns received special attention from the heavy ships that moved in close to shore and engaged in duels with Jap shore batteries. Most of the towns were completely leveled

planning required. Certain key members of the staff remained at Pearl Harbor for a few days after his departure in order to complete the assembly of information on the objective. The Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, analyzed the defenses of the island and prepared data to assist in determining what means would be required to take Guam.

From 15 April to 27 April 1944, the commander and staff of Task Force 53 lived with the Marines in their camp at Guadalcanal. Although this headquarters was that of the senior marine general officer in the area and was probably considered to be much more comfortable than many camps, it was still most primitive for naval officers, unused to living in the open. The dosing of atabrine and the outdoor features involved with living in tents, definitely proved a new experience for them. In spite of the comparative ruggedness of camp life, the naval staff officers became well acquainted with their opposite numbers on the troop staff and made rapid progress on the various annexes to the attack orders.

The flagship, the AGC *Appalachian*, arrived and anchored off Lunga Point on 27 April. She had barely "dropped her hook" when all the naval contingent from ashore reported aboard. Most of them were frankly anxious to terminate their living ashore in favor of their accustomed quarters aboard ship. The sojourn on land did give the naval elements an unforgettable appreciation of down-to-earth considerations regarding the health and comfort of troops ashore.

WHILE ASHORE in Guadalcanal, the inter-staff planning so necessary in an operation of the character of the Guam attack, proceeded. The assignment of ships and units slowly became firm. Most of the fire support ships were to come from the South Pacific Force. Many had a considerable background from previous participation in support of other landings. However, it soon became apparent that the assigned fire support ships were scattered far and wide over the entire South Pacific ocean areas, and that supervision of their training would be difficult.

It is necessary that all fire support ships receive adequate indoctrination in the employment of naval gunfire support as planned to be executed by particular attack force commanders. Normally, each such commander must personally insure that all fire support ships have the requisite understanding of the problems involved. Regardless of the previous practical experience (or lack of it) of the ships involved, it is necessary that they understand the viewpoint and desires of the particular attack force commander to which assigned. The best way to bring about this understanding is to brief all units involved. These briefings must include not only the fire support ships' personnel, but also those of the shore fire control parties and the air spotting agencies.

The fire support ships earmarked for Task Force 53 were located as follows: battleships and destroyers at Efate, destroyers at Espiritu Santo, cruisers and destroyers at Hathorn Sound (near Kolombongara), cruisers at Majuro, and finally cruisers and destroyers at Purvis Bay (Guadalcanal). Accordingly, gunfire support representatives of the Commander Task Force 53 and CG, Southern Troops and Landing Force, were sent to all the above places by air. Upon arrival at each stop all personnel concerned, previously alerted by despatch, were assembled in the wardroom of the senior ship present. They then listened to a complete explanation of the gunfire support plans, both from the naval and from the troop's viewpoint.

COMPLETE SHORE FIRE CONTROL parties were flown to Efate, Hathorn Sound, and Majuro, to drill with their assigned ships in communications and spotting procedures. In all cases the particular SFCPs scheduled to work with certain ships in the actual Guam attack, were able to conduct drills with these same ships and even to go aboard and get acquainted. The battleships, cruisers, and destroyers had actual firing practices, controlled and spotted by shore fire control parties.

Early in the training period it became apparent that the capture of Guam would undoubtedly involve considerable employment of shore fire control parties to link the assault troops to their assigned fire support ships. When the SFCPs were organized at Guadalcanal, it was discovered that all of the assigned naval gunfire liaison officers lacked combat experience, and that they were fresh from amphibious training schools in the Continental U. S. The South Pacific Amphibious Forces were approached and asked for the loan of twenty seasoned NGLOs that were known to be available. These naval officers were promptly supplied and were installed in the SFCPs of the I Marine Amphibious Corps. The superseded NGLOs remained in the understudy capacities and were able to receive valuable training from their more experienced brother officers. Each Guam SFCP, therefore, had two NGLOs for the training period and actual operation.

The regimental NGLOs assigned were particularly well-

trained officers who had participated in many previous operations. They supervised the NGLOs in the battalions and coordinated their work. The regimental NGLOs were also provided with the army paratroop SCR 694 radios obtained in limited numbers especially for the operation.

In connection with the detailed training of individual fire support ships, the lack of a shore bombardment range similar to San Clemente island was keenly felt. Many flying reconnaissances were made of the entire Solomons group while endeavoring to locate a suitable firing area. The island of Tetipari was finally determined to be the only satisfactory site in the vicinity of Hathorn Sound, except for Kolombongara island. The latter abounded in abandoned Japanese installations. These two islands, therefore, were used for impact areas for the Hathorn based cruisers and destroyers.

AT GUADALCANAL proper it was finally decided that the only satisfactory area for conducting realistic gunfire and air training, in conjunction with actual landing of troops, was in the vicinity of Cape Esperance. There was one dissuading note however. This area was occupied by the U. S. Army. After some dickering, the Army CG finally agreed to move his troops and equipment clear of the area when it was pointed out to him that no other location was suitable for the important dress rehearsals. The cruisers and destroyers at Purvis Bay were then able to use this area for their preliminary training.

An intensive period of training for all Task Force 53 units commenced, and was scheduled to be culminated by a full-scale rehearsal at Cape Esperance. The troops were to land with supplies and equipment under cover of live air and naval gunfire bombardments.

Since the actual attack upon Guam was to be executed by separate attack groups, two rehearsals were conducted, one for each attack group, under their respective commanders. These were completed between 23 and 27 May 1944. Many deficiencies were uncovered and were discussed freely in post-exercise critiques. Shore fire control parties landed with parent organizations and actually controlled gunfire from assigned ships. The rehearsals disclosed uniformly excellent results in the functioning of control between the SFCPs and the ships.

With all hands feeling that a really effective and worthwhile period of training in gunfire support (and everything else) had been accomplished, the task force sailed for Guam, via Kwajalein atoll. The latter was the staging point.

D-Day for Guam was originally set to be almost simultaneous with D-Day at Saipan. In order to avoid confusion "D-Day" for Guam was styled "W-Day."

The attack force left Kwajalein, full expecting to land on Guam on 18 June. However, while waiting to the eastward of Saipan for orders to execute the attack, the Japanese Fleet came, with battle flags flying, out of hiding to resist. The "turkey shoot" of June 1944 resulted, wherein most of the Jap air arm was destroyed by the U. S. Fifth Fleet forces operating in between the Jap fleet and the Marianas. The critical situation at Saipan at about the same time, was cleared to such an extent that the possibility was removed that the First Provisional Marine Brigade might possibly be landed, as a reserve, to help complete the capture of that island. The combination of these two circumstances caused W-Day to be postponed and most of TF 53 was ordered to return to Eniwetok to await further developments.

While waiting at Eniwetok, the naval and troop commanders of Task Force 53 were summoned to a conference at Saipan. While there they were able to obtain first hand information on the attack at this objective. CTF became impressed with the character and manner of the enemy's defense. Since there seemed to be plenty of time available it was decided to devote a long period to a prolonged softening up of Guam. Here, quite by chance then, was uncovered an opportunity to demonstrate the only really effective way to properly prepare an objective for an assault for troops—a careful and leisurely destruction of the enemy's defenses.

The actual softening up of Guam by cruisers and destroyers commenced on 8 July, and Adm Conolly arrived a few days later, on 11 July, to take personal charge. He left the transports and LSTs in Eniwetok and proceeded to Guam in the flagship *Appalachian*. W-Day was finally set for 21 July. This meant that 13 days could be devoted to the preliminary softening up bombardment.

THE MOST EXTENSIVE PERIOD of preliminary bombardment in World War II, delivered at Guam between 8 and 21 July 1944, included air as well as naval gunfire bombardments. Special attention was devoted to enemy guns of whatever caliber and these always remained the number one priority targets. The heavy ships were encouraged to go in close to fight duels with the shore batteries and to make piece-meal destruction of the enemy defenses. The towns of Agana, Piti, Tepungan, Asan, and Agat were completely leveled in order to ferret out all likely sites for defending guns.

The coordination of air and naval gunfire was assumed personally by Adm Conolly upon his arrival at Guam. The island was divided into northern and southern sectors. One day the air would work over the northern half of the island while naval gunfire concentrated upon the southern half. The next day the air and naval gunfire forces shifted sectors. In this manner there was no interference between air and gunfire elements. If necessary at any time, aircraft would be called in to use rockets and bombs against particular targets more suited to air than gunfire and that had been uncovered by the

Marines, moving inland from beachhead on Guam, take cover behind a partially demolished wall amid the rubble of buildings wrecked during extensive naval bombardment preceding the landing.

firing ships.

A panel of officers, called the target information board, was organized to assist Adm Conolly in evaluating target information. This board included representatives from the naval, air, gunnery, and intelligence staff sections as well as from the landing force. The group studied all reports of damage, as well as photo interpretation of new targets and maintained an up to date file upon the status of every target until positively eliminated by total and undoubted destruction.

Because of the decisive results of the June "turkey shoot" plus the continous attention our fast carrier task forces were paying to Jap air fields in the Western Pacific, there was no enemy air opposition at Guam. Not one hostile aircraft appeared during the entire campaign. Shortly before W-Day, a lone Jap plane took off from Orote airfield (at night) and escaped.

The original plans for Guam had provided for a certain amount of reconnaissance and underwater demolition team work on the landing beaches. The unexpected prolongation of the softening up period permitted a more extensive reconnaissance to be conducted with much more time available to clear out obstructions, mines, and other impediments in the way of our troops. The extra time made it possible to complete a most extensive reconnaissance, not only of the beaches but of approaches to same. The leisurely examinations disclosed that it would be possible to completely clear all obstacles prior to W-Day and also to improve the approaches to certain beaches.

It was necessary for the reconnaissance teams and later the underwater demolition teams, to operate within effective range of all types of enemy guns, including close range weapons. During their operations, therefore, the teams were closely supported by LCI(G)s, APDs, destroyers, and other heavier ships. On several occasions during extensive clearing operations, even battleships and cruisers stood by to open fire upon any sign of enemy activity. After the reconnaissance and the UDT personnel withdrew at night upon completion of assigned work, destroyers and LCI(G)s kept up their fire to prevent the enemy from making repairs.

By the day prior to the landings (W minus 1), all beaches at Asan and Agat were completely cleared of obstacles and mines, and lanes had been blasted through the coral reefs to permit more ready unloading of our troops and supplies. Also on W minus One Day, all principal enemy defenses that could interfere with the landing operations had been destroyed or completely neutralized.

AT FIRST LIGHT on the morning of W-Day, 21 July 1944, the Japanese defenders, observing from points of vantage high in the hills, were able to observe an array of our ships that removed all doubts in their minds as to when the landings would commence. On station and already working over likely areas they could count six battleships, four heavy and two light cruisers, and seven destroyers. In addition, there were a large number of LCI gunboats, equipped with rockets and machine guns.

On W-Day, the gunfire support control, coordination, and execution was handled individually by the two attack group commanders for their respective zones. The gunfire support plans were prepared in such a fashion that the execution was automatic in most cases. Ships were initially assigned directly to the assault battalions and took orders from the battalion commanders, via the shore control parties, for any support required after communications had been established. The fire support unit commanders were given broad and general directives to enable them to use their initiative in carrying out their assignments. This included augmentation of support where required.

The cumulative effect of the softening up bombardment, together with the tremendous curtain of fire delivered during the landings on W-Day, determined that only light opposition would be offered to the assault waves. W-Hour was at 0900, both at Asan and at Agat. The 3d MarDiv was firmly ashore by 1130, while down at Agat the combat teams of the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade were completely ashore at 1100.

One simple method of target designation was prescribed for use in directing fires upon certain areas requiring attention. For example, the landing beaches at Asan and Agat were called "Ralph" and "Buck," respectively. Orote Peninsula was "Sarge." All enemy shore areas expected to offer resistance to the establishment of beachheads were given such names. It was most convenient, thereby, to order all ships, via voice radio or otherwise, say, to concentrate their fire upon "Ralph," or any other area. There were no conventional coordinates required. This designation, of course, only served during the assault and the usual target designations and grid systems were used after the troops were ashore.

SOON AFTER THE LANDING, many enemy guns, parparticularly mortars, became active again and it was necessary to move the heavier ships close in to destroy them. Adelup Point, near Asan, required earnest attention from several ships when it was found to house still active guns. In the south, guns sited in Bangi Point were tough to silence.

During the night of W-Day, several fire support ships remained close to the beaches off Asan and Agat. They supplied harassing and illuminating fires throughout that night while our troops were becoming established ashore. This procedure prevented the enemy from infiltrating after darkness set in.

The USS *Pennsylvania*, who subsequently received a Navy Unit Commendation based primarily upon her gunfire support work during World War II, was assigned to a fire support area south of and close in to Orote Peninsula. This ship sat in her position, day after day, and delivered a tremendous amount of naval gunfire in support of the Agat assault. She was ideally suited for the task because of the capabilities of her 5-inch and other batteries.

The SFCPs controlled every type of fire that had ever been thought possible and actually even uncovered many new schemes for employing naval gnufire support. Full and frequent use was made of them up until the time that all organized resistance ceased. On one occasion, SFCP spotters embarked in LCI gunboats and directed the machine guns and rockets of these craft to Japanese targets that stood in the way of the advance of our troops. The LCIs were particularly good against coastal caves that sheltered the enemy.

On 21 July, CTF 53 assumed control and coordination of all air and naval gunfire support for both the Southern and Northern Attack Groups. It had previously been decided that this step would be taken upon capture of Apra Harbor. The latter was taken, as well as Orote Peninsula, on 29 July. Late that day the flagship *Appalachian* entered Apra harbor and thus became the first man-o-war to do so since December 1941. Although the harbor was swept for mines, it was discovered that the Japs had made no real attempt to lay defensive minefields—probably for the reason that their plans did not include the possibility that the U. S. would ever be able to seize the harbor from them.

THE BATTLE FOR GUAM was officially terminated on 10 August 1944, although the troops ashore still had considerable fighting to do. On that day Adm Conolly departed for Pearl Harbor, via air, after transferring command of Task Force 53 to RearAdm Reifsnider.

Before the island was "secured," more than 8,000 tons of naval projectiles had been required. The 13-day softening bombardment had made it possible to destroy, one by one, the defenses that the enemy had depended upon to repulse our troops. The same preliminary bombardment permitted a leisurely removal of all obstructions and beach obstacles as well as facilitated the widening and marking of beach avenues from seaward. The troops landed under the protection of a tremendous curtain of fire, disturbed somewhat by proximate, defiladed mortars, but still were able to land standing up in most cases. The ships kept the fire curtain available on the flanks and ahead of the troops as they moved inland. At night the enemy was kept harassed and under constant observation by fires from the supporting ships. It was possible to surround the island and deliver fires wherever required by the troops, when and if the targets were within the range bands of assigned ships.

Guam was the culmination of all that had been previously learned about gunfire support. The disappointments of Tarawa, the successes of Roi-Namur, and the innovations from Saipan were considered in detail in planning and executing all phases of the operation.

US MC

After Mr Reavis, the Deluge—

By 1stLt Harry E. Shilling

ONCE AGAIN MR REAVIS HAS DELIVERED A TERRIBLE indictment against a bulwark of Marine Corps tradition. The Reavis School[1] now has turned upon that hallowed character of the Corps, the DI,[2] and the alleged misuse of COD from everyone from the "higher brass" down to poor Lt Gish at Pendleton.

After reading Lt Reavis' latest *opus*, the Drill Instructor, that old barnacle of the Corps, must now be standing with his ceremonial robes and pick-mattock facing the east, where the sun's faint rays, heralding the dawn of a new day, will soon witness a grisly enactment of *hara kiri*. Old gunnery (now technical) sergeants must be weeping softly into their lager from Hadnot Point to Tientsin. Here a young subaltern has condemned the entire system of drill; a youth who has never stood on the palmetto-lined drill field of P.I. to hear the rousing epithet, "YOU LITTLE APE—SMITH[3] ON THE END, DO YOU LOVE ME," or the gurgling of his D.I. upon discovering a spot of rust on a bayonet scabbard.

The confused state of mind reflected in Mr Reavis' article shows that he has never understood the purpose of close order drill, which is to instill *obedience* in the minds of those being drilled. Had he learned the Recruit Depot brand of COD, he would not have made the statement that ". . . violation of leadership exist simply because the officer or noncom never had anyone to tell him the right way to lead men in drill." I submit that any officer or NCO alumnus of boot camp is acutely aware of the "right way" to teach close order drill, which is through practice and more practice. Furthermore, any such alumnus will smile when he reads that "Few officers realize the hard lot of the short men at the foot of the platoon. . ." etc. This is indeed a presumption on Mr Reavis' part, to say the least, which this reader cannot swallow.

In his criticism of the way COD has been applied in Basic School, Mr Reavis may have an ax to grind. However, this reader suspects that much of his dissatisfaction toward COD, or "Square-bashing" as our British friends call it, stems from his resentment toward the basic fundamentals of military discipline that have shocked him since leaving the halls of higher learning bordering the Severn. Trying to change the *status quo* of COD to something that would constitute a manual for students of the Chinese Fire Drill will not solve the problem.

Lt Reavis has advocated simplification of the present "column of threes" drill[4] by suggesting that certain movements be eliminated. If his proposed corrections were made, what little showmanship there is in the already simplified drill would be lost. At present, very little effort is required to halt from an oblique; the practice of assuming parade rest preliminary to coming to attention calls for no great strain on the part of the individual marine; nor is the marine who executes marching manual as his right foot hits the deck unduly overworked. Had Mr Reavis been indoctrinated into the standardized pattern of recruit training, all these movements would be second nature to him, regardless of any individuality on the part of the DI.

Such individuality in recruit training, that is to say, the drill instructor's ability to train his platoon in the way he sees fit, is the keystone of the solid COD structure in bootcamp. After learning the mannerisms of his one D I, or his DI in chief, a boot becomes seasoned in the art of interpreting various commands and cadences. Individuality, therefore, is to be lauded, not criticized, for it creates an attitude of alertness in the minds of the recruits subjected to it.

Lt Reavis has stated that "drill can be constructive, interesting and morale building. . ." This, I contend, is a bit of wishful thinking. The average marine, I submit, would rather take part in a short battalion review with the band playing full blast than to devote his energies toward facing movements, manual of arms, and the like. Joe Blow in the rear rank will suffer through COD whether it is programmed for 1300 hours or not. A competitive spirit likewise would be enhanced through ceremonies rather than prolonged close order drill.

My advice to Mr Reavis is to take off his pack, sit down and relax. His own ". . . aversion toward the futility and the tediousness of close order drill. . ." is evident enough, as is his ". . . dissatisfaction with the military environment. . ." Flaying the existing drill regulations will not hurry his metamorphosis from midshipman to marine officer of the line. USMC

[1]This term is used to describe what is undoubtedly a select group of philosophers now at Basic School. The writer bases this conclusion upon the fact that the pronoun "we" is used throughout Lt Reavis' article, evidence enough that the Lieutenant stands not alone in his convictions.

[2]Drill Instructor, of course. This writer is fascinated by the new term, "drill master," which sounds quaintly similar to the "dancing master" or the "fencing master" of bygone days.

[3]This word denotes simian-like qualities in the individual who hasn't the requisite will power to refrain from glancing at the DI while standing at attention.

[4]So referred to as to distinguish it from the old "Squads right" drill which went out of existence in 1939.

A Corporal Answers Mr Reavis

By Cpl James H. Holt

DURING THE LATTER STAGES OF THE WAR, FEBRUARY of 1945 to be exact, a very eager young man reported at the Marine Corps Base, San Diego, for Recruit Training. Having been associated with the army as a civilian employee, he was somewhat wary of the reputation the Marines had built for themselves during the war. He had seen many notices in the hometown papers regarding the efficiency of units in training at the army post, and had also actually seen the unit at work. There was quite a bit of difference in the performance of the unit and the description of that performance as printed in the local news. So naturally, any news from that time on, regardless of what unit was praised, would be met with an "I'm from Missouri" attitude. As I walked through the gate at San Diego, I felt that they would have to show me. They did, and within five minutes.

Walking across the parade ground was a recruit platoon, swinging along at a snappy cadence, obviously headed for the washracks. The uniform they wore consisted of field shoes, dungaree trousers, sweatshirts, and no headgear. Each man carried in his right hand one bucket, filled with dirty clothing, soap, and 'Kiyi' brushes. From the length of their hair and shade of their tanned skin, it would be safe to say that they were in their seventh or eighth week of Boot Camp. Of course, the picture would be incomplete without including the drill instructor. Sure enough he was there, stepping out alongside his platoon, walking abreast of the rank second or third from the rear, singing, not shouting, a rhythmic cadence. As they approached the washracks, the DI raised his voice slightly, and in two counts called "tawn-n-n, HALT!" The boots halted, and with a snap and precision that was sadly lacking in any organization I had observed in two years of casual observation of army infantry divisions. Not only did they halt, they stood their ground without moving a muscle, until given the word that started a mad dash for the insufficient number of spigots over the washracks. On the other side of the parade ground, Sea School platoons were going through drills that had given that group a reputation for being the outstanding men in the Marine Corps. Their uniform was dress greens, with cartridge belts and rifles. The drill was, as would be expected, much more complicated than the drill of the recruits. The marching manual, the "Cossack" manual, and many other rifle movements not found in the Infantry Drill Regulations were being executed as individual squads moved away from the mother platoons and back again, with a smartness that was to make a lasting impression on me, and on everyone who has ever worn the uniform of the United States Marines. I picked up my handbag, and continued on toward the Recruit Depot, firmly convinced that the U. S. Marines were the finest disciplined organization in the United States. Their discipline was shown by their close order drill, just as it was shown by their fighting record from Guadalcanal to Japan.

Recently, an article was published in the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, in which the author advocated publishing a Marine Corps Drill Manual. I believe that the publication of such a manual would be beneficial to the Marine Corps, but if it were published along the lines suggested by Mr Reavis, it would do more harm than good.

After examining the article written by Mr Reavis, we find that the proposed manual should not only contain a simple and efficient type of drill, but it should also contain many hints for the drillmaster, plus articles on leadership, thus teaching the novice to become an efficiently operating drill instructor. He claims that we should drill only in the green uniform, and when we do drill, we should refrain from giving commands in close succession, on the supposition that enlisted men feel that such commands are useless. According to Mr Reavis, the drill periods must be strictly scheduled, so many minutes devoted to each movement, and then we would feel that we were accomplishing something. I only hope that my old drill instructor, who has probably drunk himself to death, never reads that article, or he will turn over in his grave, by the numbers, and call down a curse on Basic School.

At the risk of joining forces with the "Old Corps," I wish to point out that no matter how clearly, or in what spirit a manual is written, drillmasters won't be developed through intelligent reading. The only way to learn how to drill a platoon is to get out on the drillfield and do it. There have been many pamphlets and books written on the psychology of leadership, and quite a few of them are still drifting around company libraries and offices, but the only way anyone is going to get any benefit out of them is to apply the written theory to practical work on the drill field.

THE PRESENT DRILL seems to be simple enough as it is. Why try to simplify it even more? It was adopted in place of the old "Squads Right" system prior to the war, on the assumption that draftees should spend more time in the field, and waste less time learning a complicated close order drill. Even so, drill has yet a fine effect on

morale, if it is performed properly. The average marine considers himself to be something more than a robot, and the more complex the drill is, the better he likes it. Marching along with every minute scheduled to learning the proper method of doing facings and marchings is no way to improve the morale of men who have been in the service six months or longer. The fact that they do know the drills already does have a great deal to do with the method of instruction, and for the unit to branch out to the marching manual and various other movements of a less simple nature, improves the morale of the unit, for, as the saying goes, variety is the spice of life. A man with a year or more in the Marine Corps will resent having an officer explain patiently the correct manner of doing a movement that he has done properly since his third week of boot camp, for such an explanation is an insult to human intelligence. The only progress made there is to embitter the troops against what seems to them a system of forced servitude. But if the platoon masters the elements of drill, (and most will, since all men drill fairly well after coming out of boot camp), it will prove interesting to them, give them pride in their unit and an incentive to drill better than usual if allowed to perform more complicated drills, thus getting out of the rut.

ONE OF THE BEST drilled units seen on the West Coast in 1945 was an infantry training battalion at Camp Pendleton. As I recall, their drill uniform was green undershirts, utility trousers, and field shoes. The only time they wore greens was to go on liberty. Their drill field was a dusty stretch of land, which was fairly level. Between lessons on the bayonet, combat swimming, and Judo, the men engaged in periods of drill. In this maner, the drill took on the form of athletics, and it really was a healthful exercise. Without encumbering clothing, they absorbed plenty of sun, and were free to move about without fear of incurring the wrath of the company commander the next day for wearing a dirty shirt for inspection. Had these men been in greens, not only would they have ruined their trousers in less than 15 minutes, but instead of concentrating on the drill, they would have been mentally adding up their dry cleaning bills, which are doubled many times because of useless wearing of dress uniforms. We must remember that drill is a means toward an end, and you aren't going to get the desired end, good discipline, by insisting on dress uniforms where it is obviously impractical. Had these same men spent their time listening to an instructor, who would be just as bored as the men themselves, telling them how to execute a column left, the spirit so necessary to combat training would have been lost. As it was, these troops spent the greater part of their drill periods in learning a few of the advanced movements. It was a pleasure for them to operate in such close unison and with such coordination, and they left the drill field feeling a little more like intelligent marines than like a group of ROTC boys. Incidentally, speaking as one who has been in both the ROTC and the Marines, I think it safe to say that there are those who differ with Mr Reavis when he says the Los Angeles ROTC unit would win a drill competition with Marines, just as they don't think the same boys a few years later, clad in the uniform of any other service, could win a drill competition with U. S. Marines. Were the Marine Corps to adopt a system of drill as outlined by Mr Reavis, the high school might win out, but the Corps still has enough experienced officers and NCOs who teach the marching manual and "Double to the Rear," even though it isn't in the book, and isn't simple, thus keeping the Marine Corps at the front of the dress parade.

But Mr Reavis did have some good suggestions in his article, just as the idea of a Marine Corps Drill Manual is a good one. He claims that the majority of officers and noncoms have only a superficial knowledge of the drill which they direct, which is sometimes true. This doesn't call for a new drill manual, but it does call for closer attention to the existing manual, and a little more off duty study on the part of the drillmasters at fault.

Naturally, there are little differences in the practice of each unit. No matter how comprehensive a manual is distributed, differences are still going to appear. I could ask how many counts are used in the execution of inspection arms, and start a minor war. But it is best to leave that to the individual. Some follow the manual, others, finding a better method, use their own. This has a healthful effect, since lack of popular acceptance on the part of any movement may lead to a change. Of course that could be overdone, but usually isn't. One of the greatest assets of the Marine Corps is the NCO who is really capable of drilling a platoon. Were you to observe him closely, and compare his methods with those suggested in the current manuals, you would find many transgressions of the written rule. Why? Because as an individual, he has found it helps the drill to "sing" a cadence, rather shout a guttural "hup, two, three, four." He has found that giving commands on successive steps, rather than allowing a step prior to the command of execution produces a smart appearing movement. These, and many other little exceptions to the general rule, keep him out of the class of the average noncom, and raise him to being known as a superior leader. A Marine Corps Drill Manual would be a good thing. Incorporate in this volume the marching manual, squads to the rear, and the many other drills and ceremonies peculiar to the Marine Corps. Bring in some of the sea-going lore as recommended by Mr Reavis and as practiced by many an "Old Corps" man. It is up to them to get us "squared-away." So, anticipating a Marine Corps Drill Manual, I'll close with. . . . .

"Fow-wa-a-a-a-d, MARCH!" USMC

Passing in Review

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

Famous Sieges . . .

THE ENEMY AT THE GATE, A book of famous sieges—Maj Reginald Hargreaves, 371 pages, sketch maps and illustrations, indexed. Harrisburg: The Military Service and Publishing Company. $5.00

It is a pleasure to come across a book such as Maj. Hargreaves has produced. The author, who has a solid reputation in England as a historian, playwright, and anthologist of short stories, displays once again the English talent for producing sound military history in a literary style which does not smack of the field manual. It is quite evident that Maj Hargreaves feels that the bare bones of an idea remain a skeleton until they are filled out with the flesh of language, and that if one is to reconstruct old skeletons it is more profitable to the reader and pleasurable to the author (or vice versa) to do so with flesh and clothing of vibrant nature and lively hue, rather than with the cold pale material of canned language.

The Enemy at the Gate is the story of ten sieges. In his introduction, which includes a special introduction for the American reader, the author explains his choice of the ten sieges out of the many in history. Those he has chosen he has reconstructed by what must have been many a dry and dusty day of research, yet they are presented with that distinction and urbanity of an author who knows that words have life as well as meaning, and are yet further illuminated by intimate glimpses of the private words and action of the public leaders—the effect thereby being achieved of reminding us that among the many possible definitions, war may be described as merely one of the more violent forms of social intercourse.

The book commences with the siege of Rome by Alaric in 410 A.D. This is followed in chronological order by Londonderry, Gibraltar, Acre, Sevastapol, Lucknow, Paris, Plevna, Mafeking, Port Arthur, and Stalingrad. Each of the sieges is the subject of a separate chapter, and each has the surrounding circumstances sufficiently described to clearly show its relationship to the war of which it was an incident.

To the military reader there is many an interesting piece of information to be found. For instance, in the siege of Gibraltar from 1779 to 1782, we can find the Spanish and French improvising what many no doubt consider as modern inventions. One of these was the construction by a French engineer of floating batteries, (to support an amphibious attack on the Rock) using a laminated armor of three layers of three-foot timbers separated by layers of wet sand and backed by a layer of damp cork. The batteries even included a network of water-pipes from a central reservoir for flooding exposed parts of the vessel. Hargreaves does not mention whether there was a counterpart of the modern damage control officer.

Of more than passing interest is the fact that the attackers also designed, and built on the spot, hinged ramps for their landing boats whose crews and landing troops received intensive training in the storming of breaches in the Rock's defenses. As it turned out the amphibious attack was a failure from a lack of understanding of the nature of the problem. The lieutenant general of the Spanish Army who commanded the joint forces had failed to insure the necessary support from the guns of the Spanish fleet, available support from land batteries was not effectively employed, and the attack was beaten off before a landing could be effected.

In view of the history of the world to date it is not surprising to note that of the six sieges of seacoast cities which are described, the forces controlling the seas were in every case the victory. The siege of Acre serves to emphasize Napoleon's fatal ignorance of the intangible known as seapower which is, apparently, a characteristic failing of those who follow the military theories of the Continent. At Acre, although having just lost the land campaign of Egypt through losing control of the Mediterranean Sea, he still seemed to think that his skilled and veteran troops could subsist when his lines of communication lay through waters which he did not control. And, to increase his venom toward the naval forces that continually blocked his road to world conquest, a landing force of British Marines and seaman gunners formed the core of Acre's defenders.

This effect of seapower on sieges is to be found in the most important siege of our own history—Yorktown.

Here the temporary loss of control of the seas by the British to our French allies decided the fate of Yorktown. By paradox, as Hargreaves points out, the control of the western Atlantic was lost while Britain was asserting control of the Mediterranean which permitted her to retain Gibraltar. Seapower being of such a mobile far-ranging nature it is not surprising that the Yorktown decision was based upon action in the West Indies. It is interesting to recall that Napoleon's decision to abandon the invasion of England was based on a French fleet failure in the West Indies to assure control of the English channel. A similar lack of control in later years was to set another former corporal on the disastrous road to Moscow.

It is interesting to note in the ten cases so aptly illustrative of sieges and the parts they play in war, that in almost every case the fate of the siege was decided by action of field forces meeting in engagements external to the siege itself. As Hargreaves points out, it is probably true that sieges only result when both the opposing commanders have failed, and that though sieges are important actions in war, they are rarely decisive in themselves. Their outcome is dependent upon decisive action elsewhere, which in many cases has decided the war without reference to the siege.

Although not mentioned in the book, the successive aerial sieges of Britain and Germany would seem to bear this out, even in the sense of a national siege. In these cases, the opponents, having failed to decisively defeat the enemy's armed forces, resorted to long-range siege with aerial weapon. Germany's air weapons were beaten back until she herself was under distant siege. And here too, as the Strategic Bombing Survey shows, the aerial siege was at best contributory to the decision that was finally obtained by defeating the decisive ground elements of Germany's armed forces.

The quality of Hargreaves work is shown by the manner in which he makes clear the nature and effect of siege warfare, while emphasizing the humaness, if not the humaneness, of war by flashes of wit and humor. **SRS**

War Novel . . .

THE NAKED AND THE DEAD—Norman Mailer. 721 pages, map. New York: Rinehart & Company. $4.00

This salty talking best-seller has caused something of a flutter in contemporary letters, and is obviously a bid for recognition as the 'best' war novel of WW II. Let us then look at the cause of all this critical acclaim—this beating of wings in the literary dovecotes.

The plot of this novel is routine and is concerned with an Army amphibious landing on, and eventual seizure of, the island of Anopopei. Anopopei is half again as large

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as Guadalcanal and has much the same terrain features: it is presumably located somewhere in the SOWESPAC.

The landing is uneventful and the ensuing successful seizure of the island, the destruction of the Jap garrison, is more-or-less typical of some operations.

The military reader will have to deduce his own task organization for the Anopopei operation. The author gives one only by implication—thus evincing a very slender military background.

Almost all of the action is built around a 14-man I & R Platoon. The platoon faces a small banzai early in the book, but its' big opportunity for glory and action arises when it is sent on a long patrol, by water, around the enemy flank. This patrol is a dismal failure, and no wonder; it is a text-book case of tarfu, worthy of being taught in the Basic School as a horrible example. There is no other military action in the book worthy of comment.

As a realistic, and therefore valuable, war novel this book is a complete failure. The errors in tactics, organization and command relationships are so numerous as to defy listing or specific comment. For page after page they follow one another with the monotonous regularity of tracer bullets.

But if Mr Mailer has failed in describing war itself he has achieved some success in projecting himself into the minds of a few of the combatants. These personality portraits (he calls them 'The Time Machine') are fairly well done and remind one a little of Thomas Wolfe.

The trademark of this book is a weary and fulsome obscenity. It is unnecessary (implication would have done as well) and annoying, and does not aid in the development of characterization: in fact, it hinders it. So, also, does much of the philosophizing which is scattered throughout the book.

A lengthy recapitulation of the good and bad points of this long novel is unnecessary. It appeals, generally, to much the same audience as *Forever Amber* and is therefore assured of considerable, if temporary, success. That Mr Mailer has talent cannot be denied; one hopes that he puts it to better use in his next book.

It should be pointed out to any prospective buyers of this novel that the source-book of 'saltiness' is on sale at any large drug-store—it is *The Collected Works of Rabelais.*

A word about the author:—The only information about Mr Mailer that is available to this reviewer is that given on the dust-cover of the novel. That says, "Brooklyn, Harvard, Leyte, Japan; soda-jerk, usher, flat-painter, rifleman; *Story Magazine, Cross Section,* a first novel—Mr Mailer's itinerary, literary and otherwise, reads like the traditional background for the novelist." Mr Mailer is 25 yeas old. JBB

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

More than half the generals in the Marine Corps recently gathered at Marine Headquarters to discuss general policies and administrative and operational matters during a two and a half day conference. Because such a concentration of Marine flag officers may not soon be repeated, the GAZETTE prints this picture with the generals' present assignments.

From left to right: (front row)

LtGen Keller E. Rockey, commanding the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic;
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LtGen Thomas E. Watson, commanding the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific;

(second row)

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(third row)

BrigGen Robert Blake, Inspector General;
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BrigGen Andrew E. Creesy, Executive Officer, Supply Department;
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